This piece has been online since July, but I'm pleased to see it made it into print in the November issue of Bioethics, as it's actually my first research publication of 2019...
It is widely assumed that the strongest case for permitting non‐medical
sex selection is where parents aim at family balance. This piece
criticizes one representative attempt to justify sex selection for
family balance. Kluge (2007) assumes that some couples may seek sex
selection because they hold discriminatory values, but this need not
impugn those who merely have preferences, without evaluative
commitments, for a particular sex. This is disputed by those who see any
sex selection as inherently sexist because it upholds stereotypes about
the sexes. This article takes an alternative approach. I argue that,
even if we accept that preference‐based selection is unobjectionable, a
policy permitting selection for family balancing does a poor job of
distinguishing between value‐based and preference‐based selection. If we
wish to permit only preference‐based sex selection we should seek to
identify parents’ motives. If we wish to justify a family balancing
policy, other arguments are needed.