Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts
Showing posts with label philosophy. Show all posts

Saturday, January 23, 2021

Publishing Advice for PhD Students: A Preliminary Review

 I don’t follow the philosophy blogosphere that closely any more. Many of the blogs that I used to follow are now dead or almost so. Some well-established sites, like Crooked Timber and Leiter Reports, still seem to be going, but I rarely visit.

 

Still, this recent piece of advice for graduate students caught my eye. Apparently it caused a bit of a stir on social media, but I didn’t hear about that until afterwards. I see why some of the advice is controversial, but there’s no denying that the author has published a lot for a PhD student, so the advice clearly works – at least for him.

 

This was interesting to me, not only because I can certainly still learn from advice myself, but also because I’m scheduled to give some advice to our own PhD students later this semester. I don’t know exactly what I’ll cover/say just yet. If I write up something, then I may share it here. In the meantime though, I have been exploring some other advice, to see what’s already out there. This post is essentially my own literature review and notes.

 

Daily Nous have previous history here, having also featured this guest post from Jason Brennan, in which he advises writing for 20 hours a week (four hours per working day). No doubt this is why he is also very prolific, with 20 books published or forthcoming. To be clear though, he isn’t recommending being a workaholic; he suggests that most people spend too long on other tasks, such as email or preparation for teaching, when they could instead by writing.

 

Michael Huemer shares this advice on publishing, which takes a blunt and at times jaded/cynical tone. Maybe the comments on longwindedness and the randomness of peer review are probably slightly exaggerated, but it strikes me as realistic on many points. For instance, once you’ve published a bit, “Many people will vaguely know who you are but not actually have read anything of yours”. That sounds about right. There are plenty of people whose work I know of, but don’t have time to read it unless (i) I need to cite it in my own work, (ii) I need to teach it, or (iii) I’m asked to review it (usually anonymously). And, even though he’s often critical of academic publishing, there’s some good advice here, particularly I think on citations.

 

While Huemer is probably right that referees can be bad in various ways and for various reasons, and sometimes the best response is simply to send the paper off again and hope for a different outcome, it should be noted that even ‘bad’ reports (by which I do not simply mean critical ones, but ones that misread the paper) can be helpful.

 

Lewis Powell has a recent post focused on highlighting the evidential value of bad referee reports. It may well be that a referee is not an ideal reader. They may be careless or inattentive. However, they are actual readers. If a referee managed to misunderstand something, then it shows that another reader might also misunderstand that point. As he puts it, the aim should not simply be to make it so that a careful reader can get your point, but so that even a careless reader cannot miss your point.

 

Finally, for now, John Danaher has a pair of posts on writing and publishing articles, again focused on philosophy but probably somewhat applicable elsewhere. One thing I liked about the former is his observation that people are more likely to share successes than failures (apart perhaps from occasional griping at unreasonable referee reports).

 

Regarding his actual writing process, he suggests detailed planning (4-10 sides of A4) then writing 1,000-2,000 words per day, usually in a couple of hours in the morning. Unlike Hendricks and Brennan, above, he doesn’t say that this has to be two hours every day – only when actually working on a paper.

 

He says he’s more likely to submit to a journal before seeking comments from friends or colleagues. That may work for him, though it’s probably not good advice for inexperienced authors (and, of course, it produces more refereeing work for journals). It seems he, at least, has had some genuinely constructive referee reports – his piece on writing quotes one that says his paper is wrong, but nonetheless a useful contribution – though he also mentions going through the five stages of grief (denial, anger, bargaining, depression, acceptance) after rejections. Preparing for failure comes up in both pieces.

 

Having looked at some of what’s already out there, I don’t know whether I’ll have anything particularly ‘new’ to add. As I said, if I do find time to write up my own thoughts, then I’ll probably share them here (likely in March).

Monday, January 18, 2021

We found a "Paley's watch"

 While on one of our regular lockdown walks in the woods, we stumbled upon this arrangement of leaves, sticks, and stones:




It's a shame that I don't teach philosophy of religion any more, because this would be a useful example to illustrate teleological (or 'design') arguments - the classic example is William Paley's watch. While we don't know who made this, or why, we immediately assume purposive design, rather than natural chance.

Sunday, October 25, 2020

What is a circuit-breaker anyway?

For some time now, people have been talking about a circuit breaker. The proposal has been backed by Labour leader Keir Starmer. This is usually understood as a brief but extreme lockdown, intended to slow the spread of the virus. It's defined here as "a tight set of restrictions - it could feel a lot like the original lockdown - but crucially it would be for a fixed period of time".


But today, in the news, I see that John Keenan, Bishop of Paisley, is calling for what he calls a 'circuit breaker' on Christmas Day:


"Perhaps we should consider a Christmas 'circuit-breaker'. A 24-hour lifting of restrictions on gatherings and celebrations, a break in the war on Covid, just like the pause in the First World War on the Western Front in 1914, when the British and German troops laid down their guns and met in no man's land to celebrate Christmas"


It seems this comes from a paywalled article in the Sunday Times, which I've not read, but the same wording is reported by both the BBC and STV, so I assume it's accurate.


While the more important question is probably whether or not this is a good idea, my main puzzlement is why he uses the term 'circuit breaker' seemingly to mean a temporary lifting of restrictions, rather than imposition or tightening of restrictions. It's an example of someone using a term to mean the exact opposite of its ordinary meaning.


Who does he think he is? Humpty Dumpty?

Tuesday, August 22, 2017

Quotable Philosophy

Whilst reading through a number of articles of late, both for teaching prep and research purposes, I came across a couple of wonderful quotations, so I thought I'd share them:

"I could here have bored the reader with a long theoretical explanation of why such a critical or deconstructive reading is warranted, and mentioned names like Habermas, Foucault and Derrida. But I am not convinced that that would really add to the strength of my argument, apart from the implicit appeal to authority and the number of extra footnotes it would have allowed me."
Holm (2004), p. 30.

"I recognize the importance of these points, and have discussed them in a longer draft; unfortunately, space limitations prevent me from adequately addressing them here."
Temkin (2008), p. 194.


Thursday, June 11, 2015

New Publication: Fairness and Aggregation

Now published (online) in Utilitas - available here (with subscription).

This was my first experience of co-authoring a journal article - something that's common in many fields (particularly the sciences) but still pretty rare in philosophy. It's something that I'd be happy to do again though.

Sunday, March 03, 2013

Co-Authorship in Philosophy

There's an interesting discussion of co-authorship over on Leiter's blog. (The discussion is primarily about what input counts as 'authorship' and how credit should be divided between authors, rather than how to go about it or whether it's a good idea.)

My own contribution was to suggest that perhaps we should think of the 'authors' credited in a paper as contributors, rather than authors in the traditional sense. This, I think, better captures some of the reasons for which we may think that someone deserves credit, even if they weren't actually involved in the writing of a paper.

Thursday, February 14, 2013

Pistorius and Ordinary Language Philosophy

This story seems tragic for all concerned. I couldn't help but notice, however, that this BBC feature on reactions to the news says "Early media reports suggested that Mr Pistorius may have accidentally shot his girlfriend, believing her to be an intruder".

Anyone familiar with Austin's 'A Plea for Excuses' is likely to remember the famous footnote in which he distinguishes between mistakes and accidents. The details of the Pistorius case aren't fully clear, but it seems that he purposely shot the person in his house - it wasn't an accident, where the gun just went off in his hand. What occurred was a case of mistaken identity: what he thought was an intruder was actually his girlfriend, Reeva Steenkamp. He didn't intend to shoot her, but that makes the case a mistake, rather than an accident. Accidents just happen (befall), whereas mistakes depend on wrong choices.

Austin's distinction sounds plausible to me, but it's interesting (in this and other cases) to consider whether it describes a distinction implicit - albeit imperfectly observed - in ordinary language, or is simply a philosopher's stipulation about terms that, ordinarily, are interchangeable. The BBC's original story, however, does respect the distinction: "Reports say he may have mistaken her for a burglar".

Monday, September 10, 2012

CFP: ALSP conference 2013 (Stirling)

Association for Legal and Social Philosophy
2013 Annual Conference: 24th-25th June

Division of Law and Philosophy, School of Arts and Humanities, University of Stirling, Scotland
Local organisers: Ben Saunders and Rowan Cruft

Keynote plenary speakers:
Bob Goodin (ANU/Essex)
Serena Olsaretti (ICREA-Pompeu Fabra/Cambridge)

Theme: Combining Theory and Practice
Papers are welcome in any substantive area of legal, social, or political philosophy (justice, democracy, rights, liberalism, communitarianism, punishment, etc) and from any philosophical methodological approach, but we particularly welcome those addressing the conference theme. These may be primarily either theoretical or practical in nature, but should seek to connect or combine the theoretical and the practical realms. They might, for instance, demonstrate how theoretical contributions can inform practice or illustrate how practice (and empirical study of practice) has implications for theory.
Both individual papers and proposals for panels on related topics are welcome.

Please send paper/panel proposals to alsp2013@stir.ac.uk by 14th January 2013. Submissions should consist of a title and 400-500 word abstract (for each paper, in the case of panels). These may be sent in the body of the email or as an attachment (.doc, .docx, .pdf), but please ensure that they are prepared for blind review (i.e. author’s name and affiliation should appear in your email but not with the abstract).

Any queries can be directed to Ben Saunders (ben.saunders) and/or Rowan Cruft (rowan.cruft), followed by @stir.ac.uk .

Tuesday, September 04, 2012

Solidarity in Bioethics

I have a piece published in the current (Sept 2012) issue of Bioethics, a special issue devoted to 'Solidarity in Bioethics'. The good news is that the whole issue is currently freely available without subscription here. I'm told that this will last throughout September. Here's the abstract for my piece:

ABSTRACT

Proposals for increasing organ donation are often rejected as incompatible with altruistic motivation on the part of donors. This paper questions, on conceptual grounds, whether most organ donors really are altruistic. If we distinguish between altruism and solidarity – a more restricted form of other-concern, limited to members of a particular group – then most organ donors exhibit solidarity, rather than altruism. If organ donation really must be altruistic, then we have reasons to worry about the motives of existing donors. However, I argue that altruism is not necessary, because organ donation supplies important goods, whatever the motivation, and we can reject certain dubious motivations, such as financial profit, without insisting on altruism.

Once solidaristic donation is accepted, certain reforms for increasing donation rates seem permissible. This paper considers two proposals. Firstly, it has been suggested that registered donors should receive priority for transplants. While this proposal appears based on a solidaristic norm of reciprocity, it is argued that such a scheme would be undesirable, since non-donors may contribute to society in other ways. The second proposal is that donors should be able to direct their organs towards recipients that they feel solidarity with. This is often held to be inconsistent with altruistic motivation, but most donation is not entirely undirected in the first place (for instance, donor organs usually go to co-nationals). While allowing directed donation would create a number of practical problems, such as preventing discrimination, there appears to be no reason in principle to reject it.

Friday, April 13, 2012

Leiter Philosophy Journals Poll

I've reported before on various journal rankings, so I thought it worth noting that Brian Leiter is running a new poll via his blog (voting form here) seeking to identify the best 'general' philosophy journals. I've been thinking that I should probably send some of my work to such general journals, rather than the specialist political philosophy journals, so I'll certainly be keeping an eye out for the results.

Saturday, March 24, 2012

Joint Sessions

The 2012 Joint Sessions (of the Mind Association and Aristotelian Society) will be held in Stirling this July. This is the UK's biggest professional philosophy conference. The website has just gone live and registration will soon be open (from 1st April). On that note: (fairly hefty) late registration fee will apply after the end of May. I should also encourage delegates to pay by debit, rather than credit, cards where possible: although the cost to the delegate is the same, credit cards incur a processing fee which means we lose money that would otherwise have gone to a registered charity (i.e. University of Stirling - and through us also to the Mind Association and Aristotelian Society).

Wednesday, January 11, 2012

A Conversation on Philosophy

The blog's been awfully quiet lately, with me being busy with marking and then away for Christmas and New Year (though the fact that it no longer reaches readers via Facebook is also a downside), but here's an interesting report of a conversation about the nature and value of philosophy, pitched towards a 'layperson'.

Friday, November 04, 2011

PGR SASP

It seems that the St Andrews/Stirling Program (SASP) has slipped to 3rd in the UK according to the latest Philosophical Gourmet Report preview. This is a bit of a shame, having been 2nd in the last two. No doubt it is in part due to some senior retirements in both departments, with new appointments at St Andrews not yet announced (at least at the time of the surveys).

Saturday, October 01, 2011

Dick and Philosophy

Yesterday one of my students asked whether Philip K. Dick and Philosophy was out yet. (I presented a draft version of my chapter to our student philosophy society last year.) It's not and, at the time, I had no idea when it's scheduled for release but, checking Amazon, I was pleased to see that it's out 24th November. My chapter, concerning appointing rulers by random mechanisms (as in Dick's Solar Lottery), is number ten.

Wednesday, September 21, 2011

Ps and Qs (Bleg)

Something I've just been thinking about and want a second opinion on. (It's not anything I'm working on, just a thought sparked by something I was reading.)

Suppose we have two propositions, P and Q. P is true. Q is a more extreme version of P. Does it follow that Q is false? Or that we have reason to believe P rather than Q?

I think much depends on the content of these propositions and the way in which Q is more extreme than P. For instance:

P: Abortion is usually wrong.
Q: Abortion is always wrong.

Here P allows (though does not logically imply) that some abortions are not wrong, which Q doesn't. If it's the case that some abortions are permissible, then Q is false and we have reason not to believe it.

But one problem is that P, while true, might be under inclusive. For instance:

P: Abortion is always wrong after 30 weeks.
Q: Abortion is always wrong after 28 weeks.

Stipulate that Q is true. Then it follows that P is true also, because P is weaker. That Q is more extreme than P does not make it false, because it is true (by stipulation), even though P is also true. Someone who believes P believes truly, but they also have reason to adopt the more extreme position Q. (Because P is true, but not the whole truth.)

I think this counter example works, but it depends of course on P not being the whole truth. I'm wondering if there are other counter examples. I suspect, perhaps, there may be some in which the way that Q is more extreme than P is practically irrelevant. These would seem, at least, cases where though Q is actually less correct, there is no harm in moving from the correct belief P to the not entirely correct belief Q, given that Q entails P.

Thoughts and comments welcome...

Wednesday, August 17, 2011

National Student Survey

Stirling comes joint third among Scottish universities (behind St Andrews and Glasgow but ahead of Edinburgh), with 88% of respondents declaring themselves satisfied overall with their course. In Philosophy, the news is even better, with 97% overall satisfaction, though this is still a fall from last year's 100%.

Wednesday, June 01, 2011

Roundtable of Journal Editors

This discussion of how journals work in Theoria is quite interesting, especially I assume for those without much insight. I'm somewhat surprised how difficult it seems to be to find referees, though perhaps this explains why I've sometimes been asked to review some stuff that hardly falls in my area of expertise (narrowly defined). As suggested, it's doubtless because of increasing pressures to publish, and a significant influx of submissions from graduate students.

I'm not sure about the suggestion that quality should outweigh quantity in assessing scholars by their publications though. It seems to me that, other things equal, someone producing more good scholarship ought to be preferred to someone producing less scholarship of an equal - or maybe even slightly higher - standard. (This is all the more true, I think, given that quality is difficult to measure - though I'm unsure whether quantity should be measured in articles or words.) Of course, we should factor in considerations about people's circumstances: a post-doc gets more research time than a lecturer and thus ought to produce either more or better publications.

It's also interesting to get insight as to how Ethics works from Henry Richardson. Apparently they now receive around 400 manuscripts a year and only a quarter even make it to review. Hence I was pretty pleased with my paper!

Sunday, May 29, 2011

BSET 2012 CFP

Having just enjoyed a very successful Law and Philosophy Graduate Conference here in Stirling, it's time already to look forward to another conference...

First CALL FOR PAPERS

The BRITISH SOCIETY for ETHICAL THEORY

2012 CONFERENCE

University of Stirling, UK

Mon 9th - Wed 11th July 2012

Keynote Speakers:

Sarah Broadie (St Andrews)
Frances Kamm (Harvard)


Papers are invited for the 2012 annual conference of the British Society for
Ethical Theory, to be held at the University of Stirling, following directly on from the Joint Session.
The subject area is open within metaethics and normative ethics. Papers on topics in
applied ethics, moral psychology or the history of ethics may also be considered provided
they are also of wider theoretical interest.

Papers, which should be unpublished at the time of submission, should be
in English, no longer than 6500 words, readable in 45 minutes and prepared for blind review.

BSET is keen that all selected papers will be communicated clearly to its conference audience.
Please bear in mind that all sessions are plenary, so the venue will be more like a lecture hall than a
seminar room.

Please send your anonymous submission electronically, and include an abstract.
In a separate document list your full name, address and academic affiliation. Those who submitted
papers for our previous conferences - successfully or otherwise - are welcome to submit again, although not the same papers.

BSET operates a system whereby the papers will have all identifications removed BEFORE being
sent to our Chief Referee, who contacts other referees and finalizes the program. The one exception to this is the identification of postgraduate status. Please tell us if you are a postgraduate student as submissions from
postgraduates are encouraged; we aim to have at least one graduate speak at the conference.

Selected conference papers will be considered for publication in the journal Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice. Please make clear in any covering email
whether you intend your paper to be considered for publication here as well as
for the conference programme, although final decision on this matter need not be made by the author
until the time of the conference itself.

The deadline for submissions is Friday 9th December 2010.

Papers and accompanying particulars should be emailed to the contact email on the following page:

http://www.bset.org.uk/2012.html [under construction]

Note that ONLY electronic submissions will be accepted.

Wednesday, March 16, 2011

Journal Rankings Compiled

I'm often looking up reports on journals in deciding where to submit papers, particularly when I stray from specialist political philosophy journals into more general venues. With that in mind, I thought it would be helpful - to me at least, but hopefully to others too - to compile some useful resources.

Brian Leiter had a survey of the journals, including general ones, publishing the best work in moral and political philosophy. Results here:
1 Ethics
2 Philosophy & Public Affairs
3 Phil. Review
4 J. Phil.
5 Journal of Political Philosophy
6 Nous
7 Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
8 Utilitas
9 Mind
10 Phil. Studies
(Pleased to see I've already published in two of those!)

A survey on Thom Brooks' blog - which I reported on here - produced the following ranking (I think it should be noted that 'general' journals appeared to systematically outperform 'specialist' ones):
1 J. Phil.
2 Phil. Review
3= Philosophy & Phenomenological Research
3= Nous
5 Mind
6 Ethics
7 Phil. Studies
8= Philosophy & Public Affairs
8= Synthese
10 Analysis

Finally, but by no means least, Brian Weatherson reports the results of a survey here. He doesn't provide a ranking, partly because a range of different measures are given, but going by the mean (avg) ranking here's how some of the above perform:
1 Phil. Review - 8.9
2 Mind - 8.7
3= J. Phil. - 8.6
3= Nous - 8.6
5 Ethics - 8.5
6 Philosophy & Public Affairs - 8.3
7 Philosophy & Phenomenological Research - 8.2
8 Phil. Studies - 7.3
9 Journal of Political Philosophy - 6.2
10 Utilitas - 5.8

Monday, March 14, 2011

The Relevance of Philosophy

Just a plug for two interesting threads over at Leiter Reports:

First, famous people with philosophy degrees. (See also the list compiled here - h/t Rachele.) Maybe not wholly reliable, but a useful resource now I'm Careers Liaison Officer for Philosophy in Stirling.

Second, this discussion of the importance of the history of philosophy, which looks like it will generate an interesting debate.