Ps and Qs (Reposted)

I tried this before, but didn't get any comments - perhaps because I think there was some Facebook problem at the time (posts here are imported onto Facebook and I get most of my comments that way) - so I thought I'd try again...

Something I've just been thinking about and want a second opinion on. (It's not anything I'm working on, just a thought sparked by something I was reading.)

Suppose we have two propositions, P and Q. P is true. Q is a more extreme version of P. Does it follow that Q is false? Or that we have reason to believe P rather than Q?

I think much depends on the content of these propositions and the way in which Q is more extreme than P. For instance:

P: Abortion is usually wrong.
Q: Abortion is always wrong.

Here P allows (though does not logically imply) that some abortions are not wrong, which Q doesn't. If it's the case that some abortions are permissible, then Q is false and we have reason not to believe it.

But one problem is that P, while true, might be under inclusive. For instance:

P: Abortion is always wrong after 30 weeks.
Q: Abortion is always wrong after 28 weeks.

Stipulate that Q is true. Then it follows that P is true also, because P is weaker. That Q is more extreme than P does not make it false, because it is true (by stipulation), even though P is also true. Someone who believes P believes truly, but they also have reason to adopt the more extreme position Q. (Because P is true, but not the whole truth.)

I think this counter example works, but it depends of course on P not being the whole truth. I'm wondering if there are other counter examples. I suspect, perhaps, there may be some in which the way that Q is more extreme than P is practically irrelevant. These would seem, at least, cases where though Q is actually less correct, there is no harm in moving from the correct belief P to the not entirely correct belief Q, given that Q entails P.

Thoughts and comments welcome...

Ps and Qs (Bleg)

Something I've just been thinking about and want a second opinion on. (It's not anything I'm working on, just a thought sparked by something I was reading.)

Suppose we have two propositions, P and Q. P is true. Q is a more extreme version of P. Does it follow that Q is false? Or that we have reason to believe P rather than Q?

I think much depends on the content of these propositions and the way in which Q is more extreme than P. For instance:

P: Abortion is usually wrong.
Q: Abortion is always wrong.

Here P allows (though does not logically imply) that some abortions are not wrong, which Q doesn't. If it's the case that some abortions are permissible, then Q is false and we have reason not to believe it.

But one problem is that P, while true, might be under inclusive. For instance:

P: Abortion is always wrong after 30 weeks.
Q: Abortion is always wrong after 28 weeks.

Stipulate that Q is true. Then it follows that P is true also, because P is weaker. That Q is more extreme than P does not make it false, because it is true (by stipulation), even though P is also true. Someone who believes P believes truly, but they also have reason to adopt the more extreme position Q. (Because P is true, but not the whole truth.)

I think this counter example works, but it depends of course on P not being the whole truth. I'm wondering if there are other counter examples. I suspect, perhaps, there may be some in which the way that Q is more extreme than P is practically irrelevant. These would seem, at least, cases where though Q is actually less correct, there is no harm in moving from the correct belief P to the not entirely correct belief Q, given that Q entails P.

Thoughts and comments welcome...

CV Organisation

What should go on a CV and how should it be organised?

This is something that's stressing many on the market, even to the point of debating membership of professional bodies.

One friend of mine told me that he'd had more interviews since lumping all his publications into a single list (peer review journal articles marked by an asterisk). Nonetheless, it seems that that's not the consensus view on how best to structure a CV. My eye was caught by the discussion here.

Spiros suggests that some things, including conference proceedings, popular culture books, online reviews (except NDPR) and any edited volume not by a big name editor/press shouldn't be included on the CV at all. That seems a bit extreme to me, although I think it probably is best to clearly distinguish these items from peer-reviewed research.

My CV has a section for 'research and publications'. (This allowed me to list, in a separate sub-section, working papers and those under review, without being accused of trying to pass them off as publications). Until recently, that was simply divided into 'research articles' and 'book reviews'. The problem with this is that there are one or two items in the latter category that are quite substantial (e.g. I wrote a 2,500 word book review for Res Publica that underwent - an admittedly fairly light - peer-review). On the other hand, not all of my research-related publications are really that impressive. I recently had a summary of my PhD published in an online journal (see here); which is clearly research but it feels a bit wrong trying to pass that off alongside my articles in ETMP, Philosophy and Utilitas.

My latest CV, prepared for another assault on the job market, divides publications into 'scholarly research articles' and 'other pieces' (which includes notes, replies, reviews, introductions, etc). This allows me to put the pieces I want to draw attention to up front, while still including things like the EJPE piece or popular philosophy contributions in the latter, along with my book reviews (I'd consider them to have about equal weight - which I know is virtually none). I also put my 'working papers' sub-section between the two, so people associate it with further scholarly research on-going.

I'm quite happy with the current layout, but others should feel free to discuss their preferred layouts or advice.

Bleg: Name An Article?

Ok, unusual call for help. I have a revise and resubmit on an article on democracy and non-voting. In it, I point out that behind a lot of recent arguments for compulsory voting is the (often implicit) assumption that it is democratically better if more people vote. I argue that this is not obviously the case and that non-voting may actually be helpful - e.g. because it tends to be those most affected by a decision who are more likely to vote on it and there are democratic reasons to think that they ought to have more say.

At the moment, the article is simply called 'Democracy and Non-Voting.' I quite like this title actually - it's not especially clever or catchy, but short and too the point. One of the referees did ask, however, whether I might be able to come up with something a bit more engaging. Any suggestions gratefully welcomed.

Bribing the Electorate

Thom Brooks suggested, almost a year ago, that promising tax cuts was tantamount to bribery. I'm unaware of any academic literature that makes claims like this (suggestions welcome), but it's certainly the sort of claim that features in popular rhetoric, as this recent example, concerning economic policy rather than taxation, shows.

Job Applications and CVs

I'm currently battling my ways through job applications. Well, only two so far, but I already have an idea how much work this would be. Why can't all employers use standard forms, or simply CVs? And what are they looking for in personal statements anyway? (Thanks to Dan and, especially, Chris for feedback on mine, incidentally).

I'm also thinking about my CV. A fairly recent teaching one is on the department's teaching register, here. (These may all be Oxford only - unless I by-passed that by linking straight to them). I've been comparing it to some others, particularly those who are more experienced - e.g. Steve, Keith and John. Maybe it's about time mine had a fairly thorough overhaul...

One Vote Per Issue (Bleg)

I'm trying to describe a possible voting system that gives people one vote per issue, but lets them divide those votes as they wish over a number of different issues. E.g., if we face votes on policies A, B, C, D and E then I get five votes – so if I care very strongly about D, marginally about B and not much about the other three, then I may cast four of my votes for D, one against B and effectively have no vote on A, C or E. This gives some crude measure of intensity – my strength of feeling for D is shown by the fact I am willing to give up my vote on A to have more influence on D.

I've heard people suggest such before, but I'm stuck for a name to call it. Firstly, if anyone reading happens to know of any reference that discusses such, I'd be very grateful - but, more modestly, if anyone already knows this by a certain name, or can suggest a snappy and appropriate one, I'd love to hear from you...

Bleg

Watching The Simpsons Friday night (I said it could be educational), Bart thrust his book of short stories into the dog's mouth. The camera closed in on what was left of a page reading "All in all, it had been a very strange lottery. The End" I was wondering if anyone could tell me where this came from?

Googling has so far proved ineffective. All I've found is it was used in a signature by someone posting on deviantART. The only other lead I got was to Shirley Jackson's The Lottery, but that's not the last line of her story.