Thoughts on Brexit - and what next

As the dust settles after June’s referendum, it’s notable that the leaders of the Leave campaign (Johnson, Gove, Farage, Leadsom) have all vacated the main stage, leaving it to others to negotiate Britain’s exit from the EU. This is probably wise on their part, not only because the political divorce is likely to produce considerable short-term discomfort, but also because it seems that no one had any clear post-exit strategy.

We’re told that the British people have spoken and their will must be respected. But, even setting aside reports of widespread protest voting and regretful Leavers, it’s not clear what ‘the people’ (or 52% of them) voted for, beyond the obvious (leaving the EU). Leaving the EU doesn’t itself specify what alternative arrangements should be put in place.

Some want to withdraw as completely as possible from the European project – in particular, in order to control migration. Call this Total Exit, or TE for short. But not everyone in the Leave campaign favours TE. Others made quite clear that they welcome trade and cooperation with our European neighbours, they merely oppose the EU organisation and the threat of a federal European state. These people would be happy for the UK to adopt a position like Norway or Switzerland, not an EU member but not so different in practice. For want of a better label, call this Weak Exit or WE. (For simplicity, I’ll only consider two alternatives, though there are many possibilities.)

Obviously, these alternatives are incompatible. If the UK opts for WE, then we will have no more control over migration or over laws and regulations that continue to bind us. The referendum result will, officially, be respected – we’ll be out of the EU – but many of the 52% won’t be satisfied. But, on the other hand, if we got for TE then, though we’ll have control over these things, we won’t have the strong relations with Europe that were promised and, further, this is more likely to cause great economic disruption than WE. Again, a significant number of the 52% are likely to be dissatisfied – while they may have wanted out of the EU, they didn’t necessarily want TE.

It might be that the 52% are so strongly committed to leaving the EU that they would prefer either TE or WE to continued membership, but I doubt all of them feel this way. Someone who dislikes loss of sovereignty, but is also concerned about the possible economic effects of Brexit, might reasonably prefer WE to Remain, but also prefer Remain to TE. That is, their preferences might be WE > R > TE (with ‘R’ standing for ‘Remain). If they were moderately optimistic about what ‘Leave’ meant (i.e. WE), they would vote for Leave, but they would prefer Remain if the alternative were TE.

Conversely, someone whose chief concern was migration, while ideally wanting TE, might prefer Remain to WE. The Leave campaign emphasized the threat of Turkey joining the EU but, as a member, the UK would have a veto over this. If the UK ends up like Norway, having to accept free movement but without that veto, then the UK would actually have less control over migration than before. So it could be perfectly consistent for someone to prefer Remain over WE, even if their first choice would be TE. That is, TE > R > WE.

The Leave campaign was actually a coalition of people wanting inconsistent things. Some were voting for TE and some for WE. Since we can’t have both of these, it’s likely that a considerable number of Leave voters will end up disappointed, whatever the eventual outcome – and some of them might even have preferred to remain in the EU to the eventual outcome.

Given the closeness of the result, it might seem reasonably likely that, given a choice between ‘Remain or TE’ a majority of the population would have voted to Remain and, likewise, that given a choice between ‘Remain or WE’ a majority of the population would have voted to Remain. However, this isn’t necessarily the case. So far, I’ve only highlighted divisions amongst the Leavers, but the Remain voters might also have been influenced by lack of clarity over the options.

No doubt many amongst the 48% who voted to Remain prefer that to either TE or WE. However, it could be that some were simply pessimists about the likely consequences of Brexit. Suppose, for example, that someone would really prefer WE to Remain and Remain to TE (i.e. WE > R > TE). Such a person might nonetheless have voted to Remain if they (pessimistically) thought that Brexit was more likely to result in TE than WE. Had the ballot in fact given the choice between ‘Remain or WE’ then they would have switched their vote from Remain to WE. Likewise, someone whose preferences were TE > R > WE might have voted Remain had they feared that Leave would result in WE.

So, even if some Leavers would have voted Remain, given this choice, it’s also the case that some who actually voted to Remain might have voted to Leave, given a more concrete proposal. For all the talk about ‘respecting the will of the people’ the problem is that there are more than two options. The referendum didn’t really present a choice between two clear options, but rather a choice between the status quo and a mystery box. Now we’ve chosen to open the box, what’s inside is still unclear.

Though the referendum was not legally binding, I think it would be politically impossible for the government to ignore the result. The problem, however, with respecting the will of the people is identifying what it is that the people want. Given that the only really clear outcome of the referendum is that the people are deeply divided, and that both the Conservative Party and Labour Party have been plunged into leadership contests, probably the only certainty is that the political landscape will be unsettled for some time.

One Person, One Vote?

Today the UK held a referendum on whether to remain in the EU or leave. There's an awful lot that could be said and written about this issue and the referendum campaigns, though I haven't felt the need to comment because of so many others already doing so.

As I tune in to follow the results, however, I was struck by this explanation on the BBC:

"Although the results are declared by local authority area, a referendum is different to a general election in that every individual vote across the UK counts equally towards the final result."

This does acknowledge, in passing, that this is not true in General Elections - so much, perhaps, for the argument that a vote to leave is a vote for democracy...

MPs as Trustees

One topic covered in my u/g Democratic Theory module is the nature of representation, starting with the delegate vs. trustee argument. At least since Burke, it's been argued that MPs should exercise their own judgement, rather than simply being a voice for whatever their constituents want. But delegates are also representatives. A point seemingly missed here, when it says: "Members of Parliament are representatives, not delegates, the difference being they are there to decide what in their judgment is good for us and the country, not  simply to do what we say."

University Rankings

Top universities, as rated by their students at WhatUni.com, here. A few select highlights:

1. Harper Adams University.
2. Loughborough.
...
13. Falmouth
...
22. University Campus Suffolk
...
34. York
35. St Andrews
36. Birmingham
37. Aston
38. Edinburgh
39. Royal Agricultural University (Cirencester)
40. Southampton
41. Liverpool
42. Essex
43. Cardiff
...
46. Cambridge
...
49. Warwick
50. Oxford
...
61. LSE
...
77. Bristol
78. Stirling
...
81. UCL
82. Queen Mary
83. KCL

On the one hand, it's nice to see Southampton ranked ahead of Oxbridge and most London rivals but, on the other, one can't help thinking that the whole list looks very random. Maybe it's, in part, down to the way that this 'overall table' covers a wide variety of factors ("accommodation, city life, clubs and societies, courses and lecturers, job prospects, student union, facilities, support services and an overall rating"), but perhaps it also demonstrates the folly of ranking universities based on the reviews of students who a) arguably have some vested interest and b) generally know nothing of what other universities are like to compare.

Pensions Crisis?

A friend posted this Telegraph piece on Facebook and I felt the urge to comment. According to the article, George Osborne is at least considering replacing current tax relief on pensions contributions and replacing it with a flat rate for all. The Telegraph takes a scaremongering tone, arguing that this will discourage the middle classes from saving, when many already face a pensions shortfall.

However, the idea that the government should not be giving an effectively larger subsidy to higher earners actually strikes me as one of the more reasonable things to come from this government. Here is where the article actually sets out, in concrete terms, the implications of the change:

"At present basic-rate taxpayers receive a £20 top-up from the Government for every £80 they pay into a pension.

Higher rate taxpayers, classed as those earning more than £42,385, receive £40 for every £60, while top-rate taxpayers receive £45 for every £55.
Under plans being considered by Mr Osborne for a flat rate relief of 20 per cent for all, savers will receive £25 for every £75 they contribute."

Since tax relief is worth more to those who pay more tax, higher earners currently enjoy a bigger rebate on their pension savings. Proposing a flat rate for all is actually a progressive measure - though one might even argue that lower earners should get a bigger rebate.

The Telegraph suggests that it would be the poor middle classes getting hit:

"It found that 69 per cent of those paying the 40p rate of tax are unlikely to have enough income when they retire. Basic rate taxpayers are also struggling to save enough for their retirement, with 62 per cent failing to put enough aside."

Those figures make it sound as if higher rate tax payers are less likely to have enough savings than basic rate tax payers. That's surprising. It turns out, however, that the goalpost (of adequate savings) is a moving one:

"Under official measures, the majority of higher rate taxpayers are considered to have an "inadequate" level of savings if their income in their retirement is less than half the salary they enjoyed when they were working."

In other words, higher rate tax payers are only more likely to have inadequate pension savings than basic rate tax payers because what counts as 'adequate' for them is higher. Someone currently earning £60k/yr is deemed to have inadequate savings if they will only have a £25k/yr pension. But someone earning £25k/yr has adequate savings if they will have a £13k/yr pension.

I'm no tax expert, but these proposals sound surprisingly progressive to me.

Disclaimer: I'm a higher rate tax payer.

Sortition and the House of Lords

I know that the idea of using random selection to reform/replace the House of Lords is not exactly new - see, for instance, this book - but there was a recent-ish column on the BBC website, which proposes a hybrid chamber one-third of which made up of ordinary citizens chosen at random (the other thirds being party representatives based on proportional representation and independents chosen for their expertise). Nice to see such ideas getting more public exposure.

More Liberal Alcohol Guidelines

Following my recent comments on the government's new alcohol guidelines, I have a blog post on The Conversation in which I consider them from a Millian liberal perspective.

In short, I argue that there's nothing objectionable about warning people of the dangers of alcohol, but that the guidelines would better respect individual autonomy if they simply presented the risks of different levels of consumption, allowing people to decide for themselves how much risk to accept. In other words, I think it's somewhat objectionable for the government to take it upon themselves to decide for everyone that 14 units per week is the right trade off between benefits and risk, even though the guidelines aren't actually coercive.

There's a slightly longer version of much the same argument, but with a bit more Mill in it, over on my department's blog.

Alcohol Guidelines (Again)

I already mentioned the new government guidelines last week (here), but now that they're out some further comment...

Recommended limits are indeed reduced to 14 units per week. One thing that I found interesting is that, aside from the reduction in the limit, the way that it is communicated has also changed.

At one point, the recommendation was 21 units per week for men. There was a worry that people would 'save this up' and consume all 21 units on a Friday night. Consequently, the advice was changed to 3-4 units per day, to underline that it couldn't be 'saved up'. Now, however, the worry is that people are drinking every day and not allowing their body 'recovery days' and so we're back to weekly guidelines (with an explicit recommendation not to drink every day).

I guess this is just another case that highlights the difficulty of imparting nuanced advice - based on scientific findings - in simple guidelines. That said, an older piece from Lee Jones - here - questions to the extent to which the policy really is evidence-based. He suggests that politicians have a moralistic agenda and cherry-pick evidence (and ignore counter evidence) in order to serve their purposes.

Clearly not all politicians take this view though. I wouldn't normally approve of Nigel Farage's pronouncements, but he's suggested that we all have a glass of something to protest against this state nannying.

Alcohol Guidelines

Long-term readers will possibly recall my interest in alcohol policy, chiefly minimum pricing.

It seems that new UK guidelines could reduce the recommended maximum for men, as well as recommending two 'dry' days per week and stressing that there is no 'safe' level of drinking. I don't have a problem with any of these measures; people need to be given the information necessary to make responsible decisions for themselves. It's only when the government starts to coerce competent adults for their own good that I think we ought to worry.

It was also pretty decent of them to delay these guidelines until after the Christmas/new year period too ;)

Another recommendation is to include calorie information on alcoholic drinks. Aside from helping to combat obesity, by helping people to policy their calorie intake, I've long suspected that this might do more to encourage some people to drink less than the existing warnings about the health effects of alcohol...

Festive Leicester

Consulting Garth Crooks' latest team of the week, I see he picked Robert Huth for helping Leicester to take six points out of six over the festive period.



That's odd, given that Leicester lost to Liverpool on the 26th and then drew with Man City on the 29th. Unless 'the festive period' refers to their wins over Everton on the 19th and Chelsea on the 14th, it looks like Mr Crooks dropped a bit of a clanger there...

College Lotteries

One perk of no longer being at Oxford is no longer having to participate in the annual admissions interviews, which are pretty draining for staff as well as candidates. One way to simplify the process, somewhat at least, would be to use a lottery to decide between suitably qualified applicants. I advocated such a proposal here.

This recent US-centric piece also advocates lotteries, noting that they allow colleges to draw in more diverse classes without requiring quotas (which are apparently unconstitutional in the US). Peter Stone - who drew my attention to this piece - is also an advocate of lotteries.

Election by Lot: Mississippi edition

The BBC reports that a seat in the Mississippi House was determined by drawing straws, after two candidates each received 4,589 votes.

This isn't a 'first'. The BBC mentions cases in New Mexico and Alaska, without giving any details. I suspect the former is this case (which I commented on at the time). I'm also aware of a case concerning a local, city council in Florida last year (Guardian; me).

Intriguingly, the report ends by saying that - after using a coin toss in 2006 - the state of Connecticut eliminated chance games the following year. There's no indication as to what method they do use though. Does anyone out there know?

Child Selection in the News

There's a piece in today's Guardian about whether parents should genetically engineer their children. It does note that editing children's genes goes beyond merely selecting them (via Preimplantation Genetic Diagnosis). Nonetheless, the piece refers to the ideas of Julian Savulescu - who has defended the view that parents have a moral obligation to select for better children - so it seemed like a reasonable excuse to point again to my latest publication, which defends Savulescu's position against one particular line of criticism. More details here.

Publication: Procreative Beneficence, Intelligence, and the Optimization Problem

The Oxford philosopher Julian Savulescu proposed that, where screening technology is available, parents have a moral obligation to select the children expected to enjoy the best lives. He terms this the principle of procreative beneficence. Unsurprisingly, this principle is controversial and it has been subjected to a number of criticisms, including accusations that it is eugenic. (I have criticised it myself here.)

 

My latest publication, ‘Procreative Beneficence, Intelligence, and the Optimization Problem’ (forthcoming in the Journal of Medicine and Philosophy; doi: 10.1093/jmp/jhv026), is a response to another line of criticism.

 

In a recent piece in the Journal of Applied Philosophy, Adam Carter and Emma Gordon argued that even if we accept the principle of procreative beneficence, the results are less radical than Savulescu suggests. They accept, at least for sake of argument, that parents might have an obligation to choose healthy children rather than those that will suffer (or are likely to suffer) from disease or disability. However, they argue that Savulescu fails to provide a clear example of a non-disease trait that parents have an obligation to select for (or against). In particular, they focus on Savulescu’s favoured example of intelligence, arguing that greater intelligence need not conduce to greater wellbeing.

 

My paper responds to this criticism, on behalf of Savulescu. First of all, I argue that while greater intelligence does not necessarily improve wellbeing, it is nonetheless plausible that if often does (at least within a certain range). Second, I argue that, even if this is false, Carter and Gordon’s objection to Savulescu succeeds only if the net effect of intelligence on wellbeing is neutral. If, contrary to my earlier argument, intelligence is inversely correlated with wellbeing, then parents should select in favour of lower intelligence.

 

Finally, I note that the effects of intelligence on wellbeing are likely to vary at different levels, partly for social or positional reasons (for instance, as Carter and Gordon point out, someone much more intelligent than his or her peers may have difficulty finding companions). Consequently, the optimum intelligence, with respect to wellbeing, is unlikely to be either the maximum or minimum possible. Further, this optimum level will likely vary depending upon the reproductive choices of other parents. Thus, the principle of procreative beneficence does make demands on parents, but compliance with these demands is likely to be more difficult than hitherto realised.

College is certainly no ordinary commodity...

A friend shared this on Facebook back in June, but I've scheduled this post for now because it seems relevant to those starting university this month or next.

It's an interesting piece because, rather than simply attacking the idea that college should be seen as an economic investment, it makes the point that what you get out of education largely depends on what you put in. Though students are consumers, lecturers cannot simply pocket their fees and force an education into their heads.

I sometimes use an analogy (not my own) with gym membership. Paying a subscription to a gym doesn't magically make you fitter and healthier - it provides you with opportunities to use the facilities, but you still have to work to make the most of it. So it is with university: there are many opportunities available to students at any university, but students have a responsibility to make the most of them.

This is one reason why it's difficult to rank universities based on results - those results depend not only on the 'service providers' but also the 'service consumers'.

Queues, Fairness, and Efficiency

When a scarce good has to be allocated, 'first come, first served' is often considered a decent allocative principle. According to a recent study, however, this is inefficient because of the time wasted. Adopting the principle 'last-in, first-served' - provided everyone knows this - is more efficient, because people will stagger their arrival times.

The brief BBC report - here - also mentions the possibility of picking people from the 'queue' at random. I don't see a link in the report, but it seems to be based on 'The curse of first-in-first-out queue discipline', available as a working paper here, so it's an unpublished finding as far as I'm aware. I've not had chance to read the paper yet, but it sounds interesting.

Bioethics Paper on Procreative Beneficence

My latest publication appears in the September issue of Bioethics.

The article is a response to Rebecca Bennett's criticisms of Julian Savulescu's Principle of Procreative Beneficence (PPB). Briefly, she argues that the Non-Identity Problem (NIP) shows that there cannot be a duty of Procreative Beneficence, since no one is harmed by non-compliance with this alleged duty. I reply, firstly, that she misinterprets the NIP as an argument, rather than a trilemma. One way out of this problem is to accept the notion of harmless wrongs (a possibility that she neglects, assimilating it to impersonal harm).

Second, I argue that, even if she is right that PB is not a moral duty, this doesn't show that it is a 'mere preference'. Some preferences, such as those over works of art, exhibit a similar objective or categorical status as moral judgements purport to.

Summer Berry Smoothies

We recently acquired a new blender (this one if you're interested - Amazon affiliate link) and, as a result, have rediscovered our love for smoothies. Luckily for us, this coincided with receiving some vouchers from Tesco for money off their summer berries and cherries range, which meant we #TriedForLess.

Here I'm getting things started, with bananas, raspberries, and blueberries...

 

 

You may notice this isn't our new blender - that was waiting to be washed, so using our old smoothie maker in the meantime.

 

'Recipe' 1 just uses milk (soya milk alternative in our case), plus two bananas and about half the packet (100g) of raspberries.

 

 

 

The result looks like this:

 

 

That was it for my partner, since she doesn't like blueberries in smoothies (she describes the texture as 'gloopy'). Nonetheless, blueberries are supposed to be very good for you, so here's 'recipe' 2 - pour out my partner's raspberry smoothie and now add a small handful of blueberries (about 40-50g):

 

 

The result is clearly darker:

 

 

The downside of the blueberries is that they do make more of a mess of whatever you're drinking out of - but that's what the dishwasher is for!

 

School Trip Lottery

Lotteries are often used to distribute goods (e.g. scarce resources such as transplant organs) and bads (e.g. military conscription). Of course, this isn't particularly surprising since any lottery distributing a good can be re-described as one distributing the bad of not getting that good, and vice versa.

Recently in the news was this case of five primary school children who were excluded from an over-subscribed school trip to Disneyland. The headline highlights that names were drawn from a hat to decide who WOULDN'T go, but names could just as easily have been drawn to decide who would go - it would simply have taken much longer and not obviously been at all preferable.

The bullet point below ("School says drawing names was fair way to deal with over-subscription") also seems to implicate that a lottery was not fair - since it does not state this as fact but only as something the school says (though no better alternative is suggested).

To be clear, we have to separate two distinct issues here. The first is whether it's necessary to exclude five children from the trip at all. One might argue that the school could somehow have avoided this situation arising. However, if we take as given that there are 54 people wanting to go and only 49 places, so that the only question is how to allocate the good of places fairly, then a lottery seems pretty clearly fair.

New Publication: Fairness and Aggregation

Now published (online) in Utilitas - available here (with subscription).

This was my first experience of co-authoring a journal article - something that's common in many fields (particularly the sciences) but still pretty rare in philosophy. It's something that I'd be happy to do again though.