Giving What We Might Be Able To

One Oxford undergraduate was so inspired by Toby Ord that he has apparently pledged to donate 10% of his future earnings to charity.

Given that he's assuming he'll be earning £40k/year, and the 10% is taken after student loans (not clear about other deductions), that should still leave him fairly well-off. Nonetheless, I think we have good reason to praise those doing more than most, even if we think they're doing less than perhaps they ought. The amount that this one person gives over the course of his life, assuming he keeps his pledge, will do a lot of good.

I wonder if that counts as research impact?

Incest in an Elevator

The other day one of my seminar groups spent a good half hour discussing whether a Millian state could prohibit incest. It's actually an example I've used myself in lectures (though not this year). For what it's worth, I think the answer is no: such interference would presumably be moralistic (or perhaps paternalistic) - it's unclear that it could count as harmful since, even if a deformed child is born as a result, that child would not have otherwise existed (and therefore cannot be harmed) and, in any case, no child need result, so at most the state should prohibit incestuous couples producing children, rather than incestuous relationships per se.

It seems that, while our state may be more liberal than in Mill's day, incest is still punished by both the courts and society, as this recent/local example shows.

Organs and Funerals

The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has suggested that the NHS could pay for the funerals of those who donate their organs. (News reported here.)

I find it somewhat curious that they draw a sharp distinction between this move and payment for the organs. Presumably this incentive is only likely to increase donation rates insofar as it is regarded by donors as a payment. So either it's a payment and thus undermines altruism and raises worries of exploitation, or it's not a payment but it's questionable whether it will really increase donation.

(Personally, I'm not convinced that donation need be wholly altruistic and am therefore open to the possibility of incentives.)

Dick and Philosophy

Yesterday one of my students asked whether Philip K. Dick and Philosophy was out yet. (I presented a draft version of my chapter to our student philosophy society last year.) It's not and, at the time, I had no idea when it's scheduled for release but, checking Amazon, I was pleased to see that it's out 24th November. My chapter, concerning appointing rulers by random mechanisms (as in Dick's Solar Lottery), is number ten.

Nirvana 20

For some unknown reason, I had some Nirvana songs stuck in my head on Friday, despite not having listened to my old Nirvana CDs in some time. It was quite a surprise then to walk in to Tesco on my way home and see them on the cover of Kerrang! It turns out that this Saturday was the 20th anniversary of Nevermind; a fact K! commemorated by means of a special tribute CD (which was much better than I expected actually). A more expensive souvenir is this 5-disc box set (£75!), though there's also a 2-disc remastered version of the album at a more reasonable price.

Ps and Qs (Bleg)

Something I've just been thinking about and want a second opinion on. (It's not anything I'm working on, just a thought sparked by something I was reading.)

Suppose we have two propositions, P and Q. P is true. Q is a more extreme version of P. Does it follow that Q is false? Or that we have reason to believe P rather than Q?

I think much depends on the content of these propositions and the way in which Q is more extreme than P. For instance:

P: Abortion is usually wrong.
Q: Abortion is always wrong.

Here P allows (though does not logically imply) that some abortions are not wrong, which Q doesn't. If it's the case that some abortions are permissible, then Q is false and we have reason not to believe it.

But one problem is that P, while true, might be under inclusive. For instance:

P: Abortion is always wrong after 30 weeks.
Q: Abortion is always wrong after 28 weeks.

Stipulate that Q is true. Then it follows that P is true also, because P is weaker. That Q is more extreme than P does not make it false, because it is true (by stipulation), even though P is also true. Someone who believes P believes truly, but they also have reason to adopt the more extreme position Q. (Because P is true, but not the whole truth.)

I think this counter example works, but it depends of course on P not being the whole truth. I'm wondering if there are other counter examples. I suspect, perhaps, there may be some in which the way that Q is more extreme than P is practically irrelevant. These would seem, at least, cases where though Q is actually less correct, there is no harm in moving from the correct belief P to the not entirely correct belief Q, given that Q entails P.

Thoughts and comments welcome...

Who Needs Males?

It's almost like something out of Jurassic Park: female guppies don't need males to reproduce.

Actually, it's not quite as exciting as sex changing. Apparently the female guppies are able to store male sperm for months after mating, before producing offspring. So males are needed somewhere along the line; the point is merely that releasing a lone female could ultimately end up resulting in a whole new colony of fish.

GRAD CONF: Political Realism (York, UK)

2011 York Graduate Conference in Political Philosophy

Theme: "Realism in Political Thought"

*CALL FOR PAPERS*

On Wednesday 16th November 2011, the postgraduates of the Political Philosophy Group at the University of York and the White Rose Association for Political Philosophy will host a one-day student-led conference on realism in political philosophy and intellectual history.

The aim of the conference is to address both the ‘realist’ turn in recent political philosophy and to offer graduate students an opportunity to present papers, receive helpful feedback in a friendly atmosphere, and exchange ideas with peers and working academics in the discipline of political theory. The conference will be student-led with support from working political theorists.

Graduate students interested in presenting papers should send their contributions (maximum 3000/3500 words in English) accompanied by an abstract (maximum 300 words in English) and a short CV, by no later than 20th October 2011.

Papers may focus on any aspect of political realism broadly understood; including (not exhaustively) realist theories of political legitimacy, non-ideal theory, and political action. Presentations should last no longer than 30 minutes, with another 30 minutes for discussion. Please note 20th October 2011 is also the deadline for registration for any person wishing to attend the conference without presenting a paper.

Conference registration will cost £15. Any who wish to attend the conference without presenting a paper can write to check availability.

To submit a paper and/or register, please send an email to Mr James Hodgson (jdh511@york.ac.uk) with ‘Registration’ in the subject line. In the body of
the text, please ensure you include: the name you wish to go on the list of attendees; your institutional affiliation; and any dietary requirements. Please address all correspondence (including paper submission and additional inquiries) to Mr James Hodgson (jdh511@york.ac.uk).

TurnItIn

The start of a new semester means new modules to teach. It's university policy here that all students essays get submitted to TurnItIn. I don't think this amounts to an assumption that they're guilty of plagiarism, but there's a discussion here on the Philosophy Smoker. (My comment here.)

First Book?

This advice thread on Leiter might be a useful resource for young academics thinking of writing their first book.

If A Tree Falls On The Road And No One's Around To Hear It...

On my way into work, at about 2:30 this afternoon, the main road between Stirling and campus (Airthrey Road) was being blocked by police because a large tree had been struck by lightning and there were concerns that it might fall. The policeman let me go past on the footpath the other side of the road (surely strange: if there's a risk of a tree falling presumably it'd be safer for my to cycle past as quickly as possible). Before I'd got very far at all, they then allowed traffic towards the university again and, shortly after, that going in to town as well, the road now re-opened in both directions.

Obviously at some point later in the afternoon they changed their mind about the safety of the situation. An all staff email round the university advised us that Airthrey Road was again closed and that we should take alternative routes home. When I left campus, I found that not only was the road cordoned off, but also the footpath, so I couldn't even get through by bike.

Now admittedly I don't know how much danger this tree poses, but the fact that they were letting traffic through previously, combined with the fact that it hadn't fallen all afternoon and there was no particular reason for it to do so in the brief time that I would be passing, led to me assume it wasn't that dangerous. In fact, I'm well aware every time that I cycle along this fairly busy stretch of road that I could get hit by a bus. It's quite possible that I'd actually be at less risk from the tree than I ordinarily am from buses (a risk removed by the closure of the road). As I say, I can't judge for sure how risky it was, but then nor could I put a figure on how likely I am to get hit by a bus.

Preventing me (or anyone else) from taking the risk is an example of paternalism - that is, the authorities pre-empt my own judgement and seek to decide for me what is good for me as if I am a child, incapable of coming to my own decisions. Many philosophers, J. S. Mill among them, think that paternalism is wrong (at least in most cases). It's true that it may sometimes be justifiable. Perhaps the fact that I didn't know the true risk, for example, means that my decision to take the risk would not really be autonomous. But, even if one agrees with that, the obvious solution is to inform people of the risk, rather than to prohibit them from taking it.

As it happened, I turned back on to campus and took another route. Not only did this take me out of my way, but it involved going up and down a hill, along a poorly-surfaced path I didn't really know, in diminishing daylight, and coming off my bike when I hit a (not very low) drop-curb. When I came out the other side, the tree hadn't fallen, so perhaps I really would have been safer taking the usual road after all...

Correlation is not Causation

The BBC reports here on a study into cycling. I'm all for cycling and pedal my way to work as often as I can, though that's markedly less often in the winter. The article mentions the contribution that cycling makes to the economy, which I'd imagine to be absolutely negligible compared to cars. Then, when it turns to the more important health benefits, it says this:

"And [the report] says a 20% increase in cycling levels by 2015 could save millions of pounds in reduced congestion, pollution levels and NHS costs.
The report says that regular cyclists take 7.4 sick days per year, compared with 8.7 sick days for non-cyclists, saving around £128m through reduced absenteeism, with projected savings of £2bn over the next 10 years."

Now it's true that cycling is exercise and exercise helps keep you fit and healthy, but it doesn't follow that cyclists take fewer sick days because they cycle. It's quite likely that those who choose to cycle are already relatively young and fit, compared to those who don't, so we'd expect them to take fewer sick days. In other words, the correlation here may simply be a case of selection bias.

The Dangers of Gunfire

This BBC piece highlights the dangers of celebratory gunfire, where bullets shot into the air can fall on and kill bystanders. This was the bit that struck me though: "a number of US states including California, Texas, Arizona and Ohio outlaw firing a gun into the air. In Minnesota, it is specifically forbidden in cemeteries." Why cemeteries?

National Student Survey

Stirling comes joint third among Scottish universities (behind St Andrews and Glasgow but ahead of Edinburgh), with 88% of respondents declaring themselves satisfied overall with their course. In Philosophy, the news is even better, with 97% overall satisfaction, though this is still a fall from last year's 100%.

Sunday Drinking Bans

I like collecting little examples of things that have been banned to use when teaching Mill's On Liberty. Most of my students, I hope, don't think that homosexuality should be banned, but here's a good one: between 1881 and 1961 it was illegal for Welsh pubs to serve alcohol on Sundays.

A UK Bill of Rights?

Apparently there's a Commission on a UK Bill of Rights, seeking written responses to its discussion paper until November. This could be a chance for some impact, particularly given that I'm organizing a conference on Democracy and Rights in September.

Vote Counting Machines

Weren't vote counting machines a huge waste of money to be necessitated by AV? And yet now it seems that we have them anyway.

Paying for Organs

More controversy about organ supplies in the news: a Dundee academic has suggested that we should consider payments to donors. This came in the BMJ (unfortunately I can't access this, at present at least), but has been widely reported, for instance by the BBC. The BBC report only mentions students and, coincidentally, the £28,000 suggested for a kidney covers three years' tuition fees (at £9,000/year) with a little beer money left over...

Organ Nudge

It seems that manadated choice concerning organ donation is a step closer, with proposals that those applying for a driving licence will have to say yes or no. (The BBC article gives the impression that this change has, or at least will, be implemented, but in fact it seems that it is simply a proposal at the moment.)

It's not much of a nudge, since it doesn't direct people towards answering yes, as some have proposed. Nonetheless, simply requiring people to confront the issue is likely I'd have thought to lead to more opting in, rather than simply passing over the issue. Even this, though, seems to have roused a lot of opposition, judging by the comments on the BBC story.

Legal Territorial Jurisdiction

I have a paper - hopefully forthcoming, details to follow - in which I claim that the law subjects everyone globally to coercion, because (for instance) a law requiring that people drive on the left in the UK applies equally to all persons driving in the UK. I think an awful lot of political philosophy/theory gets things wrong by focusing on people, rather than territory, though I understand that there have been recent moves to redress this (for instance Chris Bertram's Territory and Justice network).

Anyway, I was struck by this case, reported on the BBC. The case centres on George 'Star Wars' Lucas suing the man who originally made Storm Trooper helmets (Mr Ainsworth) for selling them, on the grounds that he (Ainsworth) no longer owned the copyright. As the BBC reports:

"Lucasfilm sued for $20m in 2004, arguing Mr Ainsworth did not hold the intellectual property rights and had no right to sell them - a point upheld by a US court.
But the judgement could not be enforced because the designer held no assets in the US, so the battle moved to the UK."

The interesting point, made explicit in an earlier version of the story, but not as clear now, is that the UK court upheld the US decision that Ainsworth could not sell the helmets in the US. This, I think, raises interesting issues, though I'm insufficiently clear on either the details of the case or the necessary legal theory. It looks to me though as if the UK court's decision binds a British citizen not to do something in US territory...