Leaning Towards AV (Though it Wouldn't be my First Preference)

In about two weeks’ time, voters in the UK will be given an historic opportunity to change the electoral system. The referendum motion asks whether the existing First Past The Post (FPTP) system should be replaced with the alternative known, conveniently enough, as the Alternative Vote (AV) system.

Unfortunately, while this is a potentially monumental issue, much of the media coverage that I’ve seen has been frankly very poor, with a lot of bad arguments and negative campaigning on offer from both sides. I thought I’d put my PhD in politics to use, by trying to offer something more sensible – though I hope that the following review won’t be too long or technical.

** Preamble **

Cards on the table time: I’m inclined to vote for the switch to AV. I say that at the start, to make clear that this won’t be an entirely neutral and dispassionate piece. Nonetheless, I’m not strongly in favour of AV, so I’ll try to resist advocacy. I think there are good arguments on each side, so if someone finds the arguments for FPTP more convincing that’s fine. My concern is that people vote based on good, informed argument, rather than on the basis of some of the bad arguments that I’ve heard thrown around.

Why the hesitancy? Well, I think it’s worth noting that NO voting system is perfect. Thankfully, our choice is this referendum is made simpler by the fact that we need not consider all of the many voting systems that have been devised. Our choice is simply between two: FPTP and AV. Hence, there’s no need to consider, for example, Proportional Representation (PR). I’ll define FPTP and AV in a moment, but first one further point is in order.

The referendum question is actually about which system we should use. In deciding how to vote in the referendum, I know some people who are swayed by other considerations, such as giving Nick Clegg a bloody nose or which option they think will favour future reform (some think AV might lead towards PR in future, while others think that this change will stifle further reform). I’m also going to set these considerations aside and focus, so far as I can, simply on the intrinsic merits of FPTP and AV.

** Defining the Alternatives: FPTP **

First Past The Post (FPTP) is probably the simplest option to understand, perhaps in part because it’s the system currently used in UK elections so already familiar to most of us. It works like this: each voter places a vote next to one candidate of their choice. After all votes are cast, they are counted. The candidate who gets the most votes is declared the winner.

It should be noted that the name – First Past The Post – is slightly misleading. There is no fixed winning post that candidates must cross. It would be possible in theory for someone to win with a very small share of the vote – just 10% for instance. Suppose we had eleven candidates competing in the election. If they are very close in support, it might be that one wins 10% of the vote and the other ten each win 9% of the vote. In this case, the former is declared the winner. This is true even though only one tenth of the electorate voted for them.

There are two points that we should notice, in particular. Firstly, the winner need not have (and in fact in UK elections rarely does have) the support of a majority (i.e. over half) of the voters. Secondly, the person with the most votes wins, even if deeply unpopular with everyone else. I’ll return to that point in a moment, but first it’s time to present the alternative.

** Defining the Alternatives: AV **

The alternative vote system allows voters to rank candidates in order of preference. Voters may, if they wish, rank only one. If everyone did that, then the system would in effect work just the same as FPTP. It also allows voters to indicate a second choice, third choice, and so on. These are their ‘alternative votes.’ In effect, it allows someone to say ‘ideally, I want X, but if not X, then I want Y’ and so on – until, if they wish, they have ranked all candidates.

Once voters have expressed their preferences, the first round of counting begins by looking only at people’s first preferences. If any candidate has a majority of votes (over half), then that candidate is duly elected. If no one has a majority, then counting proceeds to a second round. In this case, the candidate with the smallest share of first preference votes is eliminated from the running. Votes for that candidate are then redistributed – any that did not express a second preference are eliminated, while those that did are now transferred to that second preference candidate. These votes are counted equally along with first preference. In effect, the voters concerned, having had their first choice candidate eliminated, are asked for their alternative choice out of those remaining.

(In French presidential elections, there are actually two separate votes. First, everyone gets to vote for whoever they like. Then a second vote is held between the two candidates who come first and second, to see which of these has majority support. This involves only two stages, but requires a second election. The aim of AV is to allow voters to express their alternatives on a single ballot paper, avoiding the need for multiple rounds of voting.)

This process is continued, with the least popular candidate eliminated in each round, until one candidate has over half of the votes remaining active in that round. Since this may ultimately result in only two candidates left in the running, it is almost certain that one will have a majority. (The only exception is if the final two end up exactly tied, 50% each – but ties are also possible under FPTP.)

** An Illustration **

These definitions may be clearer if accompanied by an illustration of the two systems in practice. I’ll use a simplified, non-political example. Suppose we have a club with 100 members trying to decide where to go on a day out. Let’s assume that there are four options: beach (B), football (F), museum (M) and shopping (S).

1) Ten people rank the options as follows:
B > F > M > S
That is, they prefer the Beach to anything else. They like going to the Football less than the Beach, but more than either a Museum or Shopping. And, finally, they prefer the Museum to Shopping.

2) Nine more rank:
B > M
These people also prefer Beach to anything else. They express no preference, however, between the Football and Shopping (though it is assumed, since their second preference is for the Museum, that they prefer Museum to either of these; they are simply indifferent between the other two).

3) Twenty-one people rank:
F > B > M > S

4) Twenty-five people rank:
M > F > B > S

5) Thirty-five people rank:
S > M > F > B

Under FPTP, these people can only vote for their first or most preferred option. That is, the people will vote for B, B, F, M, and S respectively. These are then totalled up, to show how many people support each option. The results are as follows:

Beach: 19
Football: 21
Museum: 25
Shopping: 35

Hence it is decided that the group will go shopping, because this option has more votes than any of the other options.

Note, however, that while Shopping was the most preferred option of 35 people (just over a third of the group), it was the *least* preferred option (solely or jointly) for all of the others. These people, presumably, would be very dissatisfied with this outcome.

Thankfully, there is a remedy at hand. Suppose the twenty-one people in the third group (those who rank F > B > M > S) realise what is likely to happen. They know that the Football is not that popular, so votes for Football are likely to be ‘wasted.’ (This is analogous to those who prefer a third or fourth party, but know that either Labour or Conservatives are likely to win.) Since these people still prefer Museum to Shopping, they may decide to vote tactically. That is, they could vote for Museum, rather than the Beach, even though this is not their real first preference. Then Museum would have 46 votes (to 35 for Shopping) and so win.

AV is, in effect, a way of avoiding the need for such tactical voting. It allows people to still express their real first preference – for Football – yet also to have a say when the choice comes down to Museum or Shopping. Because of this, however, the counting of votes will be slightly more complicated. In the first round, counters will look only at first preferences, so the first round will look like this:

Beach: 19
Football: 21
Museum: 25
Shopping: 35

The same as before. No option has a majority (over half) of the votes, so counting will now go to a second round. The Beach – as the least popular option – will be eliminated. Rather than effectively disenfranchising those who had voted for the Beach, though, the AV system says that we should ask how they would have voted from the remaining alternatives. (This is done without the need for a second, three-way vote, because we asked voters for their second preferences in the initial round of voting.)

Ten of those who voted for Beach would have voted for Football (their second preference) had the Beach not been an option, while the other nine would have voted for the Museum. Thus these voters are reallocated, according to these second preferences. This gives us:

Football: 31
Museum: 34
Shopping: 35

As we see, things are now very close. Had the Beach not been an available option, Shopping would still have won under a FPTP, but only by a single vote. Still, however, no option has majority support. It looks to be between Shopping and Museum, which are one and two in the votes, so Football is eliminated as now being least popular. But again to declare Shopping the winner would ignore the fact that it is the least popular option of almost everyone else. Almost two-thirds of people, in this example, would prefer either Football or the Museum to Shopping. This is confirmed when voting goes to a third stage.

Here, Football is eliminated and those whose votes are currently counted as for Football are transferred to their next preference, to see how they would vote between Museum and Shopping. As it happens, these are voters from the first and third groups above, all of whom prefer Museum to Shopping. (For some of these, Museum is their second preference and for some their third.) Thus, when these votes are reallocated, we get the following result:

Museum: 65
Shopping: 35

So Museum wins!

Sorry for the slightly lengthy explanation, but I think it goes a long way not only to explaining the difference between FPTP and AV but also the relative merits of the two. FPTP only looks at people’s first vote. Consequently, those in a minority are either effectively ignored or forced to misrepresent their true preferences by voting strategically. AV, on the other hand, looks at all of a person’s preferences. This means that an option, such as going to the Museum, can win in virtue of being a widely popular second choice, though it was not the most popular first choice. Political parties would, therefore, have incentives to appeal widely to as many voters as possible, even if they were unlikely to be first choice amongst those voters. Picking up second or third votes might still be enough to allow them to win.

Now let’s look at some of the arguments in more detail…

** Arguments Against AV, Considered and Rebutted **

One argument offered for FPTP is that it’s simpler. Voters only need to vote for one party, rather than ranking their whole preference ordering. I don’t think this shows much faith in voters. The added complexity of AV lies largely in vote counting, not in the act of voting. All voters need to be able to do is order their preferences. If you can count to three, then the chances are that you can rank three alternatives, for instance Conservative > Lib Dem > Labour. It should be added that voters are not *required* to rank all of the alternatives on offer. It’s fine to express preferences between your top three candidates, but then no further, in effect abstaining if the choices were to come down, say, to UKIP or BNP. If this is too difficult for most voters, then we probably ought to reconsider whether we want political decisions made by such idiots!

A second argument I’ve heard is that AV means giving some people more votes than others. This isn’t really true. Each person only has one vote counted at any given stage. The point is that people can also express a second preference, which might be counted *instead of their first* should their first be eliminated. These people aren’t given any more influence though, because those whose first preference is still in the running are still having their first preference counted. It seems ludicrous to suggest that someone who gets their second preference has more power or influence than someone who gets their first preference!

In fact, I think it could be argued that AV better ensures equality between voters, since it allows all voters (if they wish) to have their preference counted between whatever candidates are in the running. FPTP, as already explained, provides incentives for strategic voting. That is, savvy voters may realise that they can better serve their preferences by voting for a candidate who is not their genuine first preference. This behaviour is sometimes criticized as dishonest, though I am not sure I would go that far – why shouldn’t voters be able to use their vote as they wish? The problem, however, is that it means those who know how to ‘play’ the system can get more out of it than those who do not. The naïve bumpkin who simply votes for her genuine first preference may effectively waste her vote, when she could have been better served by voting for her second preference, to ensure that the candidate she detested did not win. This seems more inegalitarian to me. AV removes the advantage is strategic voting, so all people can express their genuine preferences and have them counted equally.

A third argument worries not simply about the fact that some people get their second preference counted, but about who these people are – namely, fringe minorities. Suppose, for instance, we had the following scenario:
49% vote Labour
48% vote Conservative
3% vote BNP, with second preference for the Conservatives
In this case, Labour would win under the FPTP rule, but under AV the 3% BNP voters would be reallocated to the Conservatives and they would win. It is worried that this makes fringe minorities potentially pivotal.

I think there is some merit to this concern, but it seems to be overstated. The electoral result doesn’t depend simply on the 3% BNP ‘fringe.’ The Conservatives only win, in this example, with those votes, but they also have 48% support in their own right. Moreover, it should be remembered that FPTP simply encourages tactical voting. The BNP supporters might simply have voted Conservative to begin with and we’d never have known. At least AV allows voters to express their true preferences and to have influence on the final choice.

Also it should be noted that a few fringe voters are unlikely in practice to make a pivotal difference. Where we have three (or four) major parties, it is likely to take the elimination of one of these before a winner is decided. Consider:
35% vote Labour
35% vote Conservative
30% vote Lib Dem
5% vote BNP, with second preference for the Conservatives
In this case, I have assumed more BNP support (5% rather than 3%). Even so, the elimination of the BNP leaves us with 40% Conservative, 35% Labour, and 30% Lib Dem, so still no overall winner. Who wins will depend on the second preference of (in this case) Lib Dem voters, not (only) the BNP voters.

These are some of the arguments that I’ve heard most commonly presented in the media. As should be obvious, I think that they’re all bad. AV isn’t too complicated (in fact it’s often used in many elections, including in student societies), doesn’t mean that some voters count for more, and doesn’t mean that electoral results will be determined by fringe minorities. There are, however, some better arguments against it. For reasons of balance, let me consider one of the more serious.

AV asks voters to rank their preferences in order, but an ordering gives us no information about how strong someone’s preference is. One voter might be almost indifferent between the candidates she has numbered 1 and 2, while another may have a very strong preference for his number 1 and consider his number 2 merely the best of a bad bunch. Consider this case:
Forty people rank A > B > C and much prefer A to either B or C, both of which they detest.
Thirty-one people rank B > A > C, but are almost indifferent between B and A.
Twenty-nine people rank C > B > A, but are almost indifferent between B and A.

Under AV, C would be eliminated and then B would win, 60 votes to 40. This is so, even though no one has a strong preference for B over A, but 40 people have a strong preference for A over B. We should be wary, this reasoning suggests, of reading too much into second preferences. This is true, but it should be noted that it is hardly a glowing endorsement of FPTP either. People may not be equally satisfied, under an FPTP system, with the alternatives on offer and, as we have seen, many may in fact vote strategically in any case. As I said at the outset, AV isn’t perfect – no system is. While this seems like a potential problem with AV, it doesn’t show that FPTP is any better. Where our choice is between the two, I’m still inclined towards AV.

** Conclusion **

As I said at the outset, I’m not totally confident in my preference for AV, because there are problems with it, but I don’t think these should blind us to the (possibly greater) problems with FPTP just because we’re more accustomed to them.

I’m uncertain about the referendum because, given the many factors that we might consider, I’m open to saying that one’s vote in the referendum *shouldn’t* be determined simply by which, of FPTP and AV, is the better system. (For instance, perhaps one should think about which will better serve the cause of future reform.) Nonetheless, if the question were simply which is better out of the two, then I’m much more confident that AV is preferable to FPTP and that’s the way I’m inclined to vote in the referendum.

My aim isn’t to convince others, but to encourage more constructive debate. Vote how you like, provided that you’ve thought seriously about the issue and have genuine reasons, rather than bad arguments, for your choice. I’d welcome constructive disagreement in comments!

Does a Dog Know More English than Capello?

Yesterday, Fabio Capello claimed he only needed to know 100 words of English to do his job. (To be fair, it was a flippant remark, but I'm running with it.)

This BBC piece lists the 100 most common words in the English language and notes that you wouldn't be able to do much with them - it's about the vocabulary of a two year old. (Presumably Capello's vocabulary is actually larger than 100 words anyway and certainly not confined to these; you'd expect him to know some football-related terms.)
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/magazine-12894638

More interesting, however, is this feature, on a dog that reportedly understands over 1000 words. Granted, the dog's vocabulary is passive, rather than active (i.e. it wouldn't use the terms itself), but that suggests that Capello really ought to be able to master more than 100. For his sake, I hope he can...
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-12067099

EDIT: Some Blogger bug seems to be preventing me from linking, so for now just copy and paste the URLs.

Teaching in a New Environment

Moving from Oxford to Stirling has involved quite a change in teaching styles. One observation made in our Learning and Teaching Review last week is that students here are never required to submit work solely for formative assessment. Every essay that submit could count towards their degree. ('Could' because for most modules there's an optional second essay, which counts only if a higher grade than the first.)

I'm still coming to terms with the change, but there's a thread here on The Philosophy Smoker about the shift from the UK - where most universities seem, like Stirling, to go for something like two lectures and one seminar a week - to US style classes.

Journal Rankings Compiled

I'm often looking up reports on journals in deciding where to submit papers, particularly when I stray from specialist political philosophy journals into more general venues. With that in mind, I thought it would be helpful - to me at least, but hopefully to others too - to compile some useful resources.

Brian Leiter had a survey of the journals, including general ones, publishing the best work in moral and political philosophy. Results here:

1 Ethics

2 Philosophy & Public Affairs

3 Phil. Review

4 J. Phil.

5 Journal of Political Philosophy

6 Nous

7 Philosophy & Phenomenological Research

8 Utilitas

9 Mind

10 Phil. Studies

(Pleased to see I've already published in two of those!)

A survey on Thom Brooks' blog - which I reported on here - produced the following ranking (I think it should be noted that 'general' journals appeared to systematically outperform 'specialist' ones):

1 J. Phil.

2 Phil. Review

3= Philosophy & Phenomenological Research

3= Nous

5 Mind

6 Ethics

7 Phil. Studies

8= Philosophy & Public Affairs

8= Synthese

10 Analysis

Finally, but by no means least, Brian Weatherson reports the results of a survey here. He doesn't provide a ranking, partly because a range of different measures are given, but going by the mean (avg) ranking here's how some of the above perform:

1 Phil. Review - 8.9

2 Mind - 8.7

3= J. Phil. - 8.6

3= Nous - 8.6

5 Ethics - 8.5

6 Philosophy & Public Affairs - 8.3

7 Philosophy & Phenomenological Research - 8.2

8 Phil. Studies - 7.3

9 Journal of Political Philosophy - 6.2

10 Utilitas - 5.8

Banning Migrant Chefs?

This BBC article opens with the claim that:

"Migrants from outside the European Economic Area will no longer be allowed to work in the UK as chefs in takeaway restaurants, the government has said."

It's hard to be sure exactly what is the case, when one has one's reasons to doubt one's only source, but it seems like this is a misleading claim to me. It seems that the government are tightening up what's necessary for non-EEA immigrants to enter the country. Thus, those from outside the EEA won't be able to immigrate in order to work as chefs in takeaways (at least, unless they're well-paid graduates: the scheme seems to allow top chefs). There's no implication that those already in the country will be prohibited from working in takeaways - it's either alarmism or shoddy journalism to suggest that would be the case...

The Meanings of Frankenstein

Just a quick link to an interesting BBC feature on Frankenstein, suggesting ten readings/interpretations of Shelley's novel, not all of which had previously occurred to me. I found it quite informative.

The Relevance of Philosophy

Just a plug for two interesting threads over at Leiter Reports:

First, famous people with philosophy degrees. (See also the list compiled here - h/t Rachele.) Maybe not wholly reliable, but a useful resource now I'm Careers Liaison Officer for Philosophy in Stirling.

Second, this discussion of the importance of the history of philosophy, which looks like it will generate an interesting debate.

Housing Dementia Patients

The second time I've seen Stirling University in the news in just a few days: scientists have been working out how best to design living spaces for dementia patients. Details include colour-coding, lighting, and glass-fronted cupboards. They even sought to include easy internet access, on the basis that the elderly of tomorrow will be computer literate.

Of course, perhaps more worthwhile would be developing ways of combating dementia and ageing more generally - a common theme for Colin Farrelly.

Limits on Ownership

The BBC has a feature on games consoles here, noting that one's ownership is not unlimited but subject to various terms and restrictions. In fact, this is quite a common phenomenon. Books often have a condition that they cannot be lent or re-sold with an alternative cover or binding, while videos/DVDs are often not for hire or public showing.

Perhaps we don't really enjoy full ownership rights over much of what we possess. After all, the government reserves the right to regulate and tax our property. Libertarians might object to such interference but, as my friend Karl Widerquist has argued, no one buys the rights to a house (say) free from government taxation. The prices we pay for goods reflect the restrictions on them.

Me on the BBC!

Well, it's only local radio, but everyone has to start somewhere! Yesterday a brief interview with yours truly on the subject of democracy and protest was aired on 'The Other One Show' on BBC Three Counties Radio around 13:50. For those in the UK, this is available from the BBC's listen again service (for one week from original broadcast): go here to access the program, then skip through to about 45-7 minutes in to get to the bit with me in it (it's all over by 52 minutes).

Drunk Patients

Apparently a Scottish patients' group has suggested that people admitted to A&E while drunk ought to pay for their hospital treatment. It's not really clear from the BBC story what the justification for this is. It could be either a) that they may be at fault for the injury causing their admission and/or b) that they are more likely to be abusive towards staff while there. In either case, however, I'd worry that targetting all drunk people is both over- and under-inclusive.

That someone is drunk does not mean that they are responsible for an injury that they have suffered or that they will abuse hospital staff. Moreover, other people may be responsible for their injuries or be abusive towards hospital staff, though not drunk. If our concern is to charge those who are responsible for their injuries and/or abusive towards hospital staff, then we ought to focus directly on those criteria, rather than taking drunkenness as an imperfect proxy.

For the record, though, I think I'd be opposed to such measures. It's rather hard to go around assigning responsibility or fault for injury and, while I wouldn't be so tolerant of those who abuse the staff caring for them, there is a rather grey area as to what counts as abuse - it runs the risks that those who feel offended could claim to have been abused. There are good reasons, I think, to avoid delving into issues of responsibility (or means testing, etc) and to keep the NHS free at point of access. (This wouldn't prohibit taking other measures against seriously abusive patients.)

For what it's worth, Aristotle thought that penalties could be increased for those who committed crimes while drunk (para. 3 of NE III.5), and J. S. Mill thought that drunkenness - in some cases - could be fit subject for social interference, despite his celebrated 'harm principle.'

De Botton on the Nanny State

This point of view column had the potential to be rather interesting but, sadly, I found it a rather infuriating read. It seems that de Botton conflates all liberals into 'libertarians' and, for some reason, assumes that a free society/neutral state requires there to be no advertising to influence consumers. That certainly isn't the libertarian idea of the free market that I'm familiar with...

A Ban on Farting?

Apparently judicial officials in Malawi disagree as to whether a legal prohibition on 'fouling the air' makes it an offence to fart in public. One argues that it is, citing public decency, which makes it look like the law - if interpreted in this way - violates Mill's harm principle (though Mill himself had some rather incongruous things to say about public decency). It's hard to say that farting (unlike air pollution) really harms others - and, even if it does, that need not justify a ban.

Oxbridge Elites

The BBC has recently featured articles on the narrow social elite dominating British politics and music. The former particularly annoyed me, because it started out noting the trend for posh public school boys to dominate the top jobs - even noting Howard Wilson (grammar school boy and alumnus of Jesus College, Oxford) had seemed like an end to such public school domination. Around half way through, however, it suddenly switches its attention to Oxbridge.

While it's true that Oxbridge has a disproportionate number of public school students, that's largely attributable to application and qualification rates. Oxbridge entry is by academic merit - as this BBC piece highlights - and, in my experience, there's certainly no bias in favour of those from posh backgrounds. You can't simply buy your way in to Oxbridge and it doesn't (currently at least) cost more than most other universities. Thus, Oxbridge is more analogous to grammar schools than public schools.

It seems that the original BBC article misleading conflates a social (class) elite with meritocratic intellectual elite. I'd certainly hope that the politicians running the country are some of the smartest people around and, as such, it doesn't surprise me if many of them went to Oxbridge (any more than that a presumably disproportionate number are graduates). I'd be far less welcoming to rule by a narrow social elite, both because of worries about class-biased legislation and the likely implication than some of our smartest potential politicians were being denied the potential to contribute because of the accident of their lowly birth.

Burns Night

I've never been to a Burns Night celebration before. Apparently quite a few colleges in Oxford mark the occasion, but Jesus celebrates St David's Day instead and for some reason I missed out in my two years at Corpus. Nonetheless, now I'm in Scotland it seems that the occasion couldn't pass unmarked, so Eloise just made a very tasty vegetarian haggis that we had for lunch.

The BBC feature here tells us how it should be done. (H/t Alice Walla.) I can just imagine it in a hall like in Oxford. My favourite part, however, was the line that "At a more egalitarian gathering - with no high table - the chair can simply bang on the table to draw attention to the start of the evening's proceedings." I guess more is after all comparative...

Spanish Republicanism

How's this for research impact? Philip Pettit's republicanism seems to have taken off in Spain. If only everyone recognized the potential of 'philosopher kings'...

h/t Matthew Kramer, who points out the blatant falsehood of his claim that liberals cannot care about domination. They may not see it as itself diminishing freedom, but it certainly suggests a threat to freedom. A good classical utilitarian response, arguing that the problem is seen as one of security rather than liberty, can be found in the Journal of Political Ideologies here.

Initial Results of Thom Brooks' Journal Survey

Thom Brooks reports the initial results of his journal survey here (see his post for an explanation of the methodology, and try the survey yourself here). Here's a quick summary of some of those most relevant to me (i.e. political philosophy):

1. Journal of Philosophy 87
2. Philosophical Review 84
3. Philosophy & Phenomenological Research 83
3. Nous 83
5. Mind 82
6. Ethics 80
7. Philosophical Studies 79
8. Philosophy & Public Affairs 77
10. Analysis 76
10. Philosophical Quarterly 76
10. American Philosophical Quarterly 76
10. Philosophers' Imprint 76
10. Monist 76
10. Canadian Journal of Philosophy 76
16. Journal of the History of Philosophy 75
16. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 75
20. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74
25. Philosophy 70
25. Ratio 70
28. Journal of Moral Philosophy 69
33. Journal of Ethics 66
42. Journal of Political Philosophy 62
49. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy 60
53. Ethical Theory & Moral Practice 57
56. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 56
57. Political Theory 55
57. Social Theory & Practice 55
57. Economics & Philosophy 55
62. Law & Philosophy 54
66. Journal of Applied Philosophy 53
70. Political Studies 51
71. Journal of Value Inquiry 51
76. Bioethics 48
78. Politics, Philosophy, Economics 47
90. Ratio Juris 38
97. Res Publica 35
109. Review Journal of Political Philosophy 30
114. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 28

As Thom notes in his own analysis, specialist journals (and a fortiori those that aren't really philosophy journals at all, even if they may publish philosophical work, e.g. Political Studies) seem to fare worse than might be expected. I speculate as to why this might be so in my comment:

I had a few goes at this and have one observation that might explain the poorer than expected showing for Political Studies - namely, we were asked to compare two journals *as philosophy journals*.

Had I been asked to compare Political Studies to, say, The Journal of Value Inquiry (which tied in your poll), I probably would have said that the latter is better qua philosophy journal, even if I regard the former as a better journal simpliciter.

Maybe the poll would have produced less surprising results if we'd been asked not to rank the journals as a whole but asked how we'd rank an average philosophical paper in each journal. (Though then I guess someone might complain that there are no philosophical papers in some.)

Also, I'm inclined to think that, when being asked to rank how good some journal is, qua philosophy journal, it's not unreasonable to favour a more general journal, because it will be of interest to a wider range of philosophers.

More Controversy Around My Articles

A sizeable section of the latest issue of Politics seems to be given over to my views on compulsory voting: two critiques of my earlier article and a reply by me to one of them (I don't know why I was only invited to reply to one).

Stirling Albion Need Footballers

Sadly, despite the University of Stirling's sporting reputation, I haven't played football since leaving Oxford. It's a shame that I'm currently down south, because it looks like Stirling Albion are desperate to bring in some ringers for their upcoming games against Falkirk. Guess I don't really count as a free agent or recently retired player though...

Amazon Sale

Christmas is over - time for the Bozing Day sales. I just picked up Oceansize's Home & Minor EP/mini-album for a bargain £1.99!

Prisoners to Get the Vote

Following up on an earlier post, prisoners serving fewer than four years are to be granted a vote. I've been reading some stuff on felon disenfranchisement lately, so this is quite an interesting development.

Moral Philosophy in the News

I've mentioned my friend Toby Ord on this blog before, but he's in the news again for his charitable work. Kudos to Toby!

Comment: Mike from Bolton suggests that they could donate more money in the future by investing now. That may be true but, having heard Toby talking about this, I believe he thinks it's better to spend the money to alleviate suffering that's happening now. Indeed, I believe he thinks there's even a case of borrowing money in order that it can do good now and be repaid later.
This may involve the questionable assumption that it's better to save the life of a 20 year old today than that of a different 20 year old in 30 years' time, but I believe that's his view.

Who Wants to Live Forever?

Apparently, scientists have had some success not only in slowing but actually reversing ageing in mice. The story was noted by Colin Farrelly here. This same story also led to this point of view on the BBC, in which the author questions the wisdom of combating ageing.

Here's my comment:

The point of reversing ageing isn't simply to keep us barely alive in the way that the author suggests at the end, but to arrest both physical and mental decline. If you could be as healthy at 100 as you were at 50, there's no reason why you couldn't continue an active life - for instance working and babysitting your great grandchildren.

The author may say "most of us don't want to live forever" but I don't see what evidence she has for this. In my experience, most people still in possession of their faculties want (as she says) to live longer. If this applies equally at 500 as at 50, then I see no reason to suppose that most people will ever reach a point where they're bored of life.

Colin has more on the imperative to tackle ageing.

Man Can Live on Potatoes Alone

One of the many advantages of living with Eloise is her cooking, sporadically documented here. As you'll see, plenty of variety (over the weekend, we had bean chilli, curry, and vegetable roast, all supplemented with homemade mince pies and shortbread). I'm a simple soul though and quite like my basic carbs, usually in the form of bread (which Eloise also bakes herself), though potato is almost as good.

I wouldn't go as far as this American man, who set out to prove that the potato isn't as bad as many think, by eating an all-potato diet for two whole months. And he lost weight. So much for the Atkins diet!

Worth Measuring but not Funding?

There's been much controversy about recent moves in UK education funding, which in effect remove government teaching subsidies from most arts courses in order to prioritise the hard sciences and engineering, which (supposedly) produce greater economic returns. It's been said that the REF's measure of research 'impact' is too narrowly focused on economic results (such as development of new products).

I see that the Con-Dem government recognize that economic performance isn't all that matters and want to measure people's happiness, rather than wealth. I wonder if this is simply because they hope that the figures will look better, or whether it signals that they might change their minds over the narrow economics-driven focus of their education policy...

Nudges and Shoves

The idea that it's permissible to 'nudge' people in desirable directions has received much attention over the last few years. I've noted and commented on various incentive schemes before.

There is arguably a significant difference between offering an incentive to make one course of action more desirable and a threat or penalty to make another action less desirable. (This difference need not be one in freedom - I can agree with Steiner that threats don't reduce liberty, but they do render the agent worse off.)

It seems that some are considering a tax on junk food as a way of combating obesity. This, however, seems to me the wrong way to go about things. It ignores Mill's observation that “Every increase of cost is a prohibition, to those whose means do not come up to the augmented price; and to those who do, it is a penalty laid on them for gratifying a particular taste” (On Liberty, ch. 5: p.111 of my edition).

The BBC article draws an analogy with smoking, which it suggests is taxed because it is unhealthy. There is an important difference, however, in that smoking is often harmful to others - hence the ban on smoking in public places, which is not paternalistic and can probably be justified consistently with Mill's harm principle. Arguably a tax can also be regarded as preventing (or at least reducing) harm to others, rather than to the agent him- or herself.

To ban junk food would seem to be paternalistic and thus objectionable. To tax it seems to differ only in degree.

If those in power wish to encourage healthy lifestyles, I think they should employ the carrot rather than the stick - for instance subsidizing fresh fruit and vegetables or doing more to encourage cycling and other forms of exercise.

Where to Publish?

A familiar problem for those in the later stages of their PhDs or early career (i.e. in temporary jobs) is the trade off between the need to publish in good journals and the need to publish quickly, meaning you don't have time to wait a year for a rejection. There's an interesting-looking thread on the best (philosophy) journals for junior people to submit to over at the Philosophy Smoker...

Correlation vs Causation?

I never really did enough political science to get a proper understanding of maths and stats, but the one handy question I learned (which can be asked of a lot of presentations) is whether the findings show causation (i.e. A actually results in B) or merely correlation (i.e. the two merely happen to occur together, perhaps because both are results of C).

Unfortunately, I see no evidence that anyone asked that question before this scaremongering claim that texting leads to underage drinking and sex:
Parents have been warned to watch out for signs of excessive texting in their children, amid concerns it poses a new health risk.
Teenagers sending 120 text messages a day are more likely to drink, smoke and have sex, claims a US doctor.

That teenagers who text heavily are more likely to have done these things does not mean that texting causes them to engage in such activities. The causation could possibly run the other way round or, perhaps more plausibly, it could be that both behaviours are explained by some third factor, such as high disposable income or lack of parental supervision.

Re-Running Elections

Two high court judges have ordered the re-running of this year's General Election in Greater Manchester, after finding Phil Woolas guilty of making false claims about his rival. Not as bad as in the States though, where the recent elections saw FOUR deceased candidates win (via Thom Brooks). If we had an electoral system that produced a rank ordering over candidates, that was independent of irrelevant alternatives (as Arrow suggests), then this wouldn't be a problem. As it is, the system merely picks a 'top choice' and will need to be re-run...

Want to be my colleague?

Of potential interest to anyone finishing a PhD in normative philosophy: my department are currently advertising for a one year lecturer (Feb 2011-Jan 2012) to teach courses primarily in moral theory and metaethics. Deadline 12 noon on 18/11/10.

Enfranchising Prisoners

My recent talk in St Andrews addressed the issue of immigrants, but one thing that came up in it was whether criminals ought to be enfranchised. It's interesting to read that the European Court of Human Rights has just ruled that a blanket ban on prisoners voting violates their human rights. Interestingly, it seems that this doesn't prevent some - perhaps even most - being disenfranchised, but a blanket ban is unlawful. Perhaps it would be enough to allow just a few to vote.

French Paternalism

In another recent news story that would have Mill spinning in his grave (following my earlier report of this), it seems that French coastguards want to ban swimming the channel on grounds that it's not safe.

There are suggestions that simmers might cause an accident, so if the worry is that it poses a danger to others, then perhaps Mill would allow a ban (though only if it violates an obligation to an assignable individual). Most likely, this is health and safety gone mad. Swimming the channel is likened, in the BBC report, to crossing the M25. Of course, all road-crossing is dangerous, and could cause an accident, so perhaps we should ban people from crossing the road too...

Miller Conference

By the time this post is scheduled to go 'live' I should already be on my way to St Andrews for this colloquium on David Miller's National Responsibility and Global Justice (I'm giving a paper Saturday morning). It'll be nice to go for many reasons, one of course being a reunion with my former supervisor, but also because it will be my first visit to St Andrews - despite the fact that they operate a joint graduate programme (SASP) with Stirling, with I've been teaching on this semester. I hope my cold goes away though...

The Drugs Don't Pay

It seems that paying people to stay off drugs works. Not too surprising I'd have thought. A basic lesson of economics is that people respond to incentives (this is essentially the central theme of Freakonomics and the reasoning behind Nudge).

Of course, one aspect of such a scheme that may be controversial is it means paying people to do what's already in their interests. It seems that the government has recently decided that people ought to pay for what benefits them - at least when it comes to university education, though their policy may not be entirely consistent, as my friend Thom discusses here.

PHI9R4 Political Philosophy

We're still only halfway through the current semester, with most of my teaching (and all of my marking) still to come, but here's a teaser for the course that I'll be teaching next semester (the webpage having just been updated). Guess I'll need to get on with actually compiling a syllabus and reading list before long, not to mention writing the lectures...

Pammy @ Oxford

I hardly used my Oxford Union membership while in Oxford. Funnily enough though, since leaving I still get bombarded with facebook invites to events. I missed this one though - Pamela Anderson. Actually, it seems that she was talking about vegetarianism, alongside someone from PETA, which may have been interesting. But I probably wouldn't have gone...

Banning Miniskirts

I was lecturing last week on Mill's harm principle and various applications, such as what he might say about mephedrone or cannibalism. Now it seems that there's another example: an Italian town that wants to ban miniskirts and low-slung jeans! Now, back in Mill's day, it would probably have been considered indecent to show off a bit of ankle, but arguably that's just the kind of society-regulating-morality that he was trying to resist (though there is a problematic passage about public decency). Maybe I need a new irregular series about Mill spinning in his grave...

Reviewing Papers

I have a manuscript sat on my desk that I have to review for a journal. It's something I've done a good few times now, but it's surprising how little feedback one gets on the process. I only really get an idea of what's expected from the reports that I get on my own work, which vary a lot. Well, thankfully Thom Brooks is out to put that right. He's working on a piece of advice for refereeing papers (following his previous advice for publishing) and currently inviting suggestions here.

A Couple of Political Theory Bargains on Amazon

It's been suggested that we read some of Sen's The Idea of Justice in our political philosophy group here in Stirling. I have to say, I've not heard good reports about it, but I noticed that (at time of writing) it was available for only £7.65 on Amazon so thought I'd better buy it.

While looking, I also saw that they had Sandel's Justice for £2.29 (77% off RRP), which I somewhat more excited about (though I guess it will be a while until I can read it). I thought others might be interested in some bargains. (Disclaimer: Affiliate links contained above. If you purchase through these, it won't cost you anything extra, but I may earn a small commission.)

More Football Lotteries

I've long been aware of European Cup matches featuring Liverpool and Celtic that were decided by the toss of a coin. In fact, I mention these cases in a piece I wrote about the difference between penalty shoot outs and lotteries in Soccer and Philosophy. It seems that this tie-breaking method was more widespread than I'd realised though. I was just reading a preview of Liverpool's Europa League clash with Napoli and find (about half-way down) that Napoli "have met English opposition twice in Europe, being eliminated on both occasions. In 1966-67 they were beaten by Burnley 3-0 on aggregate in the Fairs Cup and in the same competition two seasons later Leeds knocked them out on the toss of a coin. Strangely Liverpool suffered the same fate in the same campaign, losing to Athletic Bilbao."

One (or two) to look up I think...

(In other news, Liverpool are being flown out by Bruce Dickinson of Iron Maiden!)

Blood Bowl

Eloise and I have been working through things to do in the evenings since moving to Scotland. So far, that's included several films and the first series of Yes Minister on DVD. We also have a pile of old board games to get through though, including Blood Bowl - a Games Workshop game that's basically a more violent version of American football set in the Warhammer world. It must be well over ten years since I played and the first time for Eloise, but it was good fun.

For the record, I was orcs and she was humans. I was receiving the ball (and thus attacking) in the first half, but got so stuck into pummelling her team that I forgot to do anything with the ball until too late. The strategy paid dividends though as by half-time I'd ko-d three of her lineman. We'd both had a man sent off for fouls, but I was able to start the second period with a numerical advantage of 11 to 8, which gave me a greater chance to stop her scoring.

As it is, Eloise came pretty close to the opening touchdown, managing to run a catcher into my end zone and get a thrower with the ball dangerously close - only for him to fall over attempting to dodge by blitzer and open up a good scoring opportunity. At this point, one of my orcs was able to scoop up the ball, while I inflicted further damage by pushing two more of her players into the crowd (where they were also ko-d). By the end of the match, she only had four men left on the pitch - who were regularly getting knocked down - though it still required my lineman to 'go for it' (and use my final team re-roll in doing so) in order to score the game's only touchdown in the final turn. A fine example, I think, of the orc strategy (i.e. concentrate on roughing up the opponents first and then use numerical superiority to score a running touchdown).

Want to be my boss?

From January, my department ceases to exist. In fact, all of Stirling's departments will, as they merge into schools. If you fancy being my new boss, we're currently advertising for head of school...

Philosophy of Football Hits the BBC!

This BBC feature on the ethics of supporting footballers who are also convicted criminals (with focus on Marlon King) is quite interesting. There's been discussion of King's case before of course, such as this piece, but the BBC piece is notable because it actually quotes Prof Mike McNamee, editor of the British Philosophy of Sport Association journal, Sport, Ethics and Philosophy.

It's good to see philosophy getting more mainstream coverage - I hope it counts as impact! Don't forget, if you want to read more philosophy about football, Soccer and Philosophy (including a chapter by yours truly) is available now.

Olympic Ticket Lottery

Want to pay £50-£725 to watch a ten-second race? You may also have to win a lottery to do so! The BBC reports here: "From March, people can register interest in an event and, if it is over-subscribed, they will be entered into a ballot."

Upcoming Talks

I'm going away for a couple of days, during which I'll be visiting Manchester to give this paper in the Mancept visiting speaker series.

It's the start of a busy period for me, as I take advantage of my light probationary teaching load. The next week I have a talk in Stirling's visiting speaker seminar (obviously not as a visitor, but a tradition for new staff apparently) and at the end of the month I'm giving a paper in a colloquium on David Miller's National Responsibility and Global Justice at the University of St Andrews.

Teaching Applied Ethics

I have a piece in the latest Journal of Medical Ethics (36:10) on teaching applied ethics. Abstract here, full text (subscription required) here.

This is my first publication under my University of Stirling affiliation, although they did get my email address wrong (that was partly my fault - I'd told them what I expected it to be, though I did then notify them that it wasn't as expected for some reason). I'm not sure whether I can legitimately count it as a 'research publication' or not though, since while it draws on discipline-specific expertise it's really a piece about teaching. Also it's published in their 'controversy' section, since it's a continuation of a debate between Rob Lawlor and David Benatar.

For those interested, the debate between Lawlor and Benatar focused on whether or not it was helpful to teach moral theories as part of applied ethics courses (particularly to medical students). The debate between them, as is often the case, seemed to reach an impasse, since both wanted to make weak claims while accusing the other of stronger ones (that is, Lawlor didn't say we should never teach moral theories).

My contribution is to suggest that, rather than focusing on whether - or how much - we teach moral theories (which may in any case be out of the instructor's control), we should focus on how we go about doing it. Specifically, I suggest that rather than starting with a theory-driven approach, we begin by examining particular issues and work from there towards theory-building.

Unfair or Unjust?

I have before wondered about the difference - if there is one - between what's (un)fair and what's (un)just. See, for example, p. 42, fn. 1 of my 'Fairness between Competing Claims' in Res Publica 16:1 earlier this year. I'm not convinced that there is any ordinary language distinction that native speakers recognize (like, say, that between mistakes and accidents).

Whilst reading about Liverpool's draw with Sunderland yesterday, however, I notice that Steve Bruce described the referee's decision to allow Liverpool's opener as "unjust, unfair and wrong". A statement from the Professional Game Match Officials (a body I'd never heard of either) argued that the decision was in fact correct, but I'm not here to debate either its substantive merits nor interesting questions about whether the referee's decision can be both unjust and the correct one for him to have made. Rather, I'm intrigued by Bruce's phrasing.

I guess it suggests that he thinks there is a difference between being unjust and unfair (and a further issue of being wrong). Presumably his distinction between what's unjust and merely unfair can't rest on an appeal to anything like the basic structure of society either, since this decision wouldn't violate Rawls' principles of justice. I wonder what he had in mind?

Challenging Degrees

A graduate from Belfast has taken his former university to court over his 2:2 degree, claiming that if he had better supervision he would have got a 2:1 (reported here). It's hard to know what to say. Firstly, I agree with the defence lawyer that court probably isn't the right place to settle such disputes. More importantly, though, I don't really see that he has a case even if his claim is true.

Let's assume that with sufficiently better supervision he could have got a 2.i. The question is whether he has any right to that level of supervision. Presumably the level (quality and quantity) of supervision is one factor in determining the degree result, but many other factors play a role, in particular the student's own level of effort. Obviously I don't know the student in question, but for most students it's true that they could also have done better had they worked harder.

No student has a right to as much supervision as they can possibly benefit from. The question is whether they get a sufficient amount, both in absolute terms (what they paid for) and relative terms (i.e. in comparison to their peers). If he got as much supervision as others, but failed to make sufficient use of it, then surely some responsibility lies with him...

How Much Are You Worth?

The BBC reports here about the findings of a survey on pay. Predictably, it seems that the public think footballers and executives should be paid less than they are and carers, cashiers and call centre workers more. In other words, it generally looks like the public favour much greater equality in earnings.

Unfortunately, it's not entirely clear exactly what the public questioned were asked. The results are certainly reported as what people should earn rather than what they are in fact paid, but the mini-survey you can take on the site asks both and it's possible that some respondents failed to appreciate these subtleties.

Nonetheless, pretty interesting stuff. Too bad university lecturers weren't included...

Vine: Go From Good to Great

Another in my infrequent series of reviews from Amazon Vine. Usually, I use them to draw attention to things I like, but this time a negative review.

How to Succeed with NLP: Go from Good to Great at Work

I've read a few self-help type books in the past, but was particularly attracted to this one because of the NLP angle (not that I'm a confirmed fan, just because I was curious). Unfortunately, I can't say that I'm really any the wiser about Neuro-Linguistic Programming. Of course, this isn't a psychology textbook - the author is upfront about the fact that this isn't an introduction to NLP but rather how to use it to 'go from good to great at work' and thus all you need to know about NLP is that it works (p. 2).

Nonetheless, I found this approach rather unsatisfying, since the reader doesn't get much insight into why particular techniques are supposed to be effective. Ultimately, the author simply reels off instruction after instruction, all justified simply because 'this is what NLP says to do.' Maybe NLP does give good advice, but all the reader gets here is some jargon, which isn't always explained. Moreover, without any insight into the fundamental principles, I have to say that I found the advice confusing at times. Sometimes, for example, you're told that it's not enough to do a great job, you must be seen to be doing so, so you should change your behaviour to stand out (e.g. p. 99), but at other times it seems to suggest that you try to fit in rather than stand out to built rapport with your team (e.g. p. 132).

Admittedly, it's difficult to give general advice in books like this, so there's always some tendency for authors to hedge their bets ('do X - a little, but not too much'), but I have to say that I didn't find the advice very useful. Often you're told what to do but not how to do it or told that you can achieve it through visualization techniques, which sound rather far-fetched to me (I didn't really try the exercises).

It's hard to give a verdict on whether the techniques work - no doubt they will for some people and not for others. The most damning indictment, in my view, though must be how badly written the book is, given the regular refrain about the importance of communication and clarity. The repetition I can forgive, since the reader is invited to pick and choose the chapters most relevant to them rather than working through the whole book, but the material didn't seem to have any coherent organization and chapters tended to jump around haphazardly.

Even at the micro-level, a number of sentences didn't clearly communicate what the author meant, for instance: "recognize what it is that you are not doing that could be holding you back" (p. 189) and, on the importance of being seen, "Picture how useful this will be when decisions are being made about redundancies, promotions, transfers and salary increases. If people don't know who you are, you will never be on the list" (p. 211).

I can't really comment on the merits of NLP, but there must be better books out there.

My review, first published here.

Another Potential Real-Life Trolley Problem

Last month I posted on this story of a runaway train on London Underground. Now it seems that something almost happened again, with one train being sent the wrong way into the path of another during rush hour yesterday. Maybe London Underground do need to employ a moral philosopher...

Do School Lotteries Work?

I've been following the Brighton & Hove school lottery case for a while (see here) and, indeed, written about it in print (see here, subscription required).

It's interesting to see this BBC headline, suggesting that the lottery failed to achieve equal access for students from poorer backgrounds. On reading the accompanying piece, however, it seems that the basis for the story is as follows: "Research presented to the British Educational Research Association on Friday says the system does not give equal chances to all pupils because catchment areas are still the main determinants of access to particular schools."

In other words, the reason it failed is not because it's a lottery (though of course equal chances don't guarantee equal success) but because it wasn't a lottery. It's important to realize that restrictions on who can enter a lottery, for example, can go a long way to 'fixing' the outcomes and therefore cancel out the benefits.

For more on these issues, see the books by my friend Olly Dowlen and Conall Boyle's recent book specifically on school lotteries.

Oxford PPE

Sorry for the lack of recent posts - today is my first day in my new job, so I've been rather busy with moving house (and country!).

My only connection to the University of Oxford now is as an alumnus, but this BBC article on the many Oxford PPEists involved in government caught my eye. Too bad they didn't research things a bit better though: the two Ps stand for Philosophy and Politics in that order...

This Situation Calls For A Philosopher!

It's often said that moral philosophers are divorced from real ethical concerns, spending their time discussing pointless issues such as trolley problems (bibliography here). In fact, it seems that these cases aren't that far from real life... Last week a runaway train travelled four miles through London's underground network, causing passenger trains to be diverted. Thankfully no one was stuck on the track and, obviously, a fat man on a bridge was unlikely, given that the train was underground. Nonetheless, I hope someone had a philosopher's phone number in case.

No Draws = Lotteries?

Long-time readers will no doubt be aware of my on-going interest in all forms of lotteries and (in connection) penalty shoot outs - though not because penalty shoot outs are lotteries as such. In fact, I wrote a chapter on the difference in Soccer & Philosophy, so won't go into that again here. Nonetheless, the gist of my argument was that penalties aren't lotteries - we could simply toss a coin to decide drawn matches, but at least penalties test some relevant skills - but either penalties or lotteries would be an appropriate way to settle a tied contest, the choice between them ultimately resting on what makes for the more entertaining spectacle.

It's interesting to see that Sepp Blatter is apparently considering doing away with draws in the World Cup group stages. Personally, I see no need to do away with draws; it seems a particularly American thing. His reasoning is that defensive teams are encouraged to play for a draw, but I'm unconvinced that introducing the 'lottery' of penalties to resolve the tie will make things any better. This way I'd have thought underdogs (with any confidence in their penalty-taking ability) will have an incentive to play for a draw knowing that they might actually win all of the points!

Who Needs Pupils?

Apparently this school is staying open despite having no pupils. I mentioned it before, but now the decision has been made. Not much more to add to what I said before really, but good to know that in a time of savage cuts to education this is something that won't be cut...

Vine: Superfreakonomics

Another of my Amazon Vine reviews; this time Superfreakonomics:

I only did a year of economics at university, because I found it rather too mathematical. Levitt and Dubner, however, do a good job of applying the insights and assumption of microeconomics to explaining everyday (and some not so everyday) decision making. They show, for example, that the laws of supply and demand apply to prostitutes, with the prices rising around public holidays and more 'seasonal workers' temporarily entering the profession.

As you may gather, the focus isn't on behaviour typically regarded as economic – in many ways, this is more of a sociology text than an economics one. Nonetheless, if you're interested in learning more about people's behaviour it provides some interesting observations and anecdotes. I haven't read the earlier book, Freakonomics, but it's quite clear that this is more of the same. You can certainly read this without having read that one – indeed, you might find it rather too similar if you have already read the first.

The writing is more like newspaper journalism than an academic text, so fairly approachable for the lay person, while all the references are hidden away at the back, to suggest that they've done their research rather than making things up without being overly off-putting for the reader. It's accessible, but I must say I found the attempts to add in some personal background about some of the people in the book rather uninteresting and also that the chapters weren't as logically structured as they might have been: often the authors go on surprising tangents that have little to do with the main subject of a given discussion, which can detract somewhat from the overall flow and make it hard to remember where you read a particularly interesting fact.

Despite my minor quibbles, I certainly found this book eye-opening. It's not unputdownable – in fact, it took me quite a long time to get round to finishing it – but I do feel that I learned something from it and would go back to it for some of the surprising findings and anecdotes.

Revise and Resubmits

A new thread up on Leiter discussing whether journals should abolish 'revise and resubmit' decisions. It promises to be an interesting one...

Here's my comment:

I think I agree with Bill Rapaport, that the R&R system is not necessarily a bad one, it's just that it doesn't always work as well as it should. I certainly know that I've had plenty of papers improve substantially as a result of a R&R verdict, whether or not subsequently accepted.

On the other hand, journal editors need to exercise discretion. I think that there can be value in sending the revised paper to a totally new referee (ideally along with the original ones), to get a fresh look at it. Problems arise when there's a long time lag involved (though unavoidable at times), when the referees give conflicting recommendations/advice, and when some of their comments are idiosyncratic. A good editor should of course be willing to accept a paper even if the author doesn't do everything the referees suggest.

There is one other problem with the system, which probably affects me more as a referee than an author, and that is that I probably do tend to give to many R&R verdicts. It's a safe 'middle ground' for the many papers that show some promise but also have some flaws. Again, though, the editor's role is important here, since there's a difference between the verdict given by each of two or three referees and the overall verdict given by the journal. The editor needs to make the call when, say, an accept and an R&R verdict ought to be an acceptance (or conditional acceptance), rather than R&R.

That the defects aren't necessary to the system doesn't, however, mean that the system ought not to be abolished. It might be that the chances of having a well functioning R&R process are so slim that we would be better off abolishing it. But I don't think that's so. I think that - while there will occasionally be cases where things go wrong - most journals can manage the system reasonably well (and it is of course open for any given journal to decide how many R&Rs, if any, to give).

One possible improvement would be to have more distinction within R&Rs. Some journals/editors do seem to distinguish minor and major revisions, but it seems to me that R&R can sometimes basically be a conditional acceptance and other times is no more than a vague willingness to look at the paper again if you completely re-write it (rather than permanently rejecting it). Perhaps it would be useful if these were always clearly distinguished.

Not For Profit: Online Reading Group

The folks over at In Socrates' Wake are hosting an online reading group on Nussbaum's Not For Profit, starting 25th August. To be honest, I'm not that big a fan of online reading groups, though I have participated in one before.

The book sounded quite interesting, so I took a look this afternoon while in the Bod for something else. To be honest, most of it is fairly predictable stuff about how the humanities foster critical thinking which is necessary for democracy and that we shouldn't neglect them in favour of a focus on the sciences and economic growth. There's a rather critical review of it here. Some of it drew on her previous work on virtue ethics and capabilities though and it was on the whole quite interesting and well written. It might even come in use for the 'Philosophy and Life' lectures that I have to give next semester in Stirling, so I think I'll keep an eye on ISW for discussion.

Amazon (UK) link:

News Spreads

I've mentioned my up-coming move to Stirling a couple of times here (e.g. one, two). Obviously, news is spreading, because my academia.edu page (EDIT: now moved/updated to here) just got its first hit from someone searching for 'Ben Saunders Stirling'. Hopefully a few more posts like this will help it in the search rankings!

Anyone looking to contact me from 1st September (by email or snail mail) would be well-advised to check for my new address, as I'm not sure how long I'll be getting stuff forwarded from Oxford.

Critiqued in JME

I had a piece on organ donation, called 'Normative Consent and Opt-out Organ Donation,' appear in the Journal of Medical Ethics back in February.

Thanks to following JME on academia.edu, I saw last night that my article has now been subject to a published critique (in the latest, August 2010, issue). They even call my proposals a 'recipe for totalitarianism' (and cite my colleague, C. C. W. Taylor, in doing so).

I'm already working on a response, so watch this space...

Vine: Meanwhile

I've mentioned before being involved in Amazon's Vine program. I recently noticed that their terms and conditions actually encourage Vine Voices to post their reviews elsewhere online, provided that the places in question don't themselves sell the products. So I thought I'd give it a go here.

Here's the first in what I hope will be a series of such posts, my review of Jason Shiga's choose-your-own-route graphic novel, Meanwhile.

This rather novel book combines are comic with a 'choose your own adventure' story. You follow the events in the life of young Jimmy, after he eats an ice cream and then stumbles upon a professor with a lab full of ingenious inventions. The story progresses from one panel to the next following little arrows and, periodically, you the reader get to choose between one of two different paths, which lead down different routes and ultimately to different endings.

Unlike the traditional choose your own adventure series that I remember as a child, this is picture rather than text based. Nonetheless, I wouldn't say that it's for young children: there's still a reasonable amount of dialogue to read, a fair amount of patience needed, and some slightly complicated instructions. Following the arrows isn't too difficult, once you get what to do, but it's not always so obvious what your choices are in some cases (and I still don't think I've really got the hang of how the access code is supposed to work either).

It doesn't seem to involve that many choices and, because the story includes a certain amount of looping around, it can get quite repetitive after a read or two. I wouldn't say that it's likely to keep anyone amused for a long stretch of continuous time - though maybe that's my short attention span and others will enjoy revisiting the same nodes and trying the various permutations in succession.

For me, this is a book that I think I could come back to again and again (there are apparently 3,856 story possibilities), but not spend too long with in any given visit. Jason Shiga definitely is some kind of genius to have come up with this though, even if it took a computer program to help organize it into book form.

Available to buy from Amazon. Disclaimer: I'm a member of Amazon's affiliate scheme, so purchasing through those links may earn me money, though it won't cost you any more. (The fact that I could earn commission won't bias my reviews - though I expect that I'll only be bringing the good stuff to the attention of my readers here.)

Mitchell Channels Mill

I'll be lecturing on J. S. Mill's On Liberty in the coming semester. It turns out that I might not need to though, since this piece by David Mitchell (on whether burqas should be banned) seems to channel his spirit rather well. As he puts it:
"In a free society, people should be allowed to do what they want wherever possible. The loss of liberty incurred by any alternative principle is too high a price to pay to stop people making dicks of themselves. But, if people are using their freedoms to make dicks of themselves, other people should be able to say so."

Ethics

I've got my name in Ethics - one of the top journals in my field. The latest issue (120:4), p. 881 (the list of manuscript reviewers for 2009).

Migrating

As I've mentioned here, I'm moving to Scotland in just over a month. The hassles may make blogging slightly more sporadic - as indeed may the fact that we'll probably be on pay as you go internet once we get there, due to the cost of reconnecting the phoneline.

In any case, I'll be documenting the process here, for anyone keen to keep in touch. My girlfriend, Eloise, will be moving up (and in) with me, so I just wanted to insert a plug for her new blog, A Duck on the Move, which seems dedicated to our migration (or should that be emigration, what with it being a new country and all?)

Of course, we're not the first to have this idea - one of my colleagues to be has a (now seemingly moribund) blog based on her new life in Scotland.

USS Pension Changes

It seems that changes in the USS pension scheme (which covers UK academics) are close to be agreed. It looks like pensions for new entrants will be based on career average earnings, rather than final salaries, which seems like quite a blow given that most don't start paying until their late 20s and often have to go the first few years post-PhD in low-paid under-employment.

To be honest, my pension is so far off that it's rather hard to predict what effects this will have on me, other than that I'll be worse off (effective immediately, as employees' contributions rise to 7.5% of salary). I think I'm glad I joined when I did though, assuming I can at some point reach a respectable 'final salary'...

Amazon Speculating

If you leave items hanging around in your Amazon shopping basket, you'll occasionally find notifications that they've changed price (particularly if on sale). This in itself isn't too surprising, though I do find it odd that sometimes things change by just a few pence and wonder whether it's really that important. I assume some of the fluctuations are linked to exchange rates, though that probably isn't all.

Anyway, this can make it rather hard to know when - or even whether - to purchase. I've recently noticed several items in my basket gradually edging downwards, but periodically one will shoot up drastically. This means that, on the one hand, there's an incentive to wait hoping for further falls, but also an incentive to buy once you're happy that the price is low enough in case it rises.

A month or so ago I bought this for £4.09 only to find it's now fallen to £1.86. On the other hand, just today I received this, which I'd caught at it's lowest price (£1.76) days before it shot up to £12.99. It seems that prices, like those of shares, can go either up or down. I'm curious whether there's any pattern to it though - and would welcome insight from anyone with knowledge, or even a hypothesis.

I've heard that Amazon may be deliberately trying to gauge customers' price sensitivity. I wouldn't have thought it would be particularly worth their while, but it occurs to me that I have no way of knowing whether price discrimination is occurring (Do I get offered what's in my basket at a different price than others? It would be possible to check, by logging out, but I've never tried...)

In any case, there's something curiously satisfying about the feeling that you got a bargain, whether by skill or luck - but caveat emptor.

UPDATE (23/7): Scored a pretty decent success today. Just found four albums before dinner that looked interesting and decided to take a punt at £7.28 the lot. By the time I got back from dinner, three of them had gone back up to normal, full price (between £10.49 and £14.49) so the same four would have cost over £40. Bargain!

Elective on Plato

I don't yet have my own staff webpage at Stirling, but I do now have a page advertising a course that I'll be running in the Spring Semester: a directed independent study 'elective' on Plato's Republic.

Advice to Journal Reviewers

From Phil Anon.

Away

Sorry that posts here have been sparse lately. I've been busy with conferences (SAP and BSET) and am currently staying in Nottingham before heading up to Stirling for a quick visit tomorrow. Normal service should be resumed shortly.

Singer on Cheating in Football

Good to see that big name moral philosophers are tackling the important ethical questions of the day, such as whether German goalkeeper Neuer should have admitted that the ball crossed the line. (Hat tip: Dominic Roser.)

It's an interesting read, though the Fowler anecdote isn't as I remember it: I seem to recall him once being booked for disputing the award of a penalty and then scoring it (but maybe I'm wrong or perhaps that was a different incident). There are, however, other cases that are rather like a batsman 'walking' - such as when a player does after a professional foul or red card.

I have to say though that I thought Singer's article was a little simplistic. It assumes that some standard set of moral rules applies universally, to footballers both qua human beings and qua football players. Maybe matters are more complicated. Perhaps - despite their gloves - goalkeepers, like politicians, cannot avoid dirty hands.

Moreover, one of the rules of football is that the referee's decision is final. Had the referee awarded a goal when the ball didn't cross the line, then it would have stood. Can the Germans really be blamed for taking advantage of the fact that he ruled this ball not to have done so? Maybe it's unreasonable to expect that, unless we're sure what we'd have done had the situation been reversed.

I haven't given a great deal of thought to these topics, but readers looking for more philosophical reflection on football are reminded of the recent Open Court title Soccer & Philosophy.

Reclining is Good for You

Personally, I tend to feel more comfortable leaning backwards in a chair, even if I sometimes worry that it suggests that I'm rather too relaxed and not paying enough attention (in a tutorial, for example). The good news is that it looks like I can now justify my preference on the grounds that it has been shown to be a better posture for your back (which is, I guess, why I feel more comfortable that way in the first place...).

Stirling

This is something that I've already told many of those who know me, but now it's on the department website I may as well make it completely public. I'll be moving to Scotland over the summer to take up a lectureship at the University of Stirling. Finally, I also get to see my name on Leiter's list of job hires! The move may make blogging sporadic over the summer, but I hope to keep updating everyone with developments.

It Could Take A Lottery To Get Us Through...

I've been keenly following the World Cup, mostly because it's football on TV and just because I can now that I'm almost finished with marking. But, while the group stages have contained some memorable matches, it's the knockout stages that I'm really looking forward to. In particular, they raise the possibility of the dreaded penalty shootout - often derided as a lottery.

Regular readers will know about my interest in lotteries, and I've already had my say on penalty shootouts in Soccer and Philosophy (currently 25% off at Amazon UK).

I'm happy to see that there's actually a role for lotteries - genuine lotteries - in the group stages too. Reading the BBC's build up to the match I see: "England must win to potentially top the group, but if both they and the US - who face Algeria - draw their matches, Capello's side need to score two goals more than the Americans to stand a chance of qualification through the drawing of lots."

This page further explains the possible permutations: "In this scenario [i.e. England and USA both drawing], England need a high scoring draw on Wednesday. Slovenia would go through as group winners, with England and USA finishing level on three points. Goals scored would decide who progresses. There is the possibility for drama even greater than that of a penalty shoot-out - if both sides are totally even then lots will be drawn to decide who goes through and who is out." Basically, the two teams will be level on head to head results, goal difference, and goals scored - so what fairer way to break the tie than a lottery?

It's not the first time lotteries have been used to decide the outcome of a football match - it's happened to both Liverpool and Celtic in the European Cup - but I wonder if they'll become more popular should England progress?

Milibands on Corpus Rents

Could disputes about 9% rent rises in Corpus Christi next year affect the Labour leadership contest? Probably not in fairness, but both Milibands (being alumni of the college) have a say here, which was picked up in the Guardian.

OUP Sale

I'm now starting my second batch of marking, and have the distractions of the World Cup and end of term when not doing it, so little time to post right now. In lieu of anything more interesting, I thought I'd draw readers' attention to the OUP summer sale (until 16th July). Up to 75% off titles including the Oxford Handbook of Political Theory and the selected papers of my colleague C. C. W. Taylor.

Voting is Compulsory in Australia

I've just dug out this reference, since it came up in a seminar today, so I thought that I may as well post it here for future reference.

It's commonly known that Australia is one of several countries where voting is compulsory. It's also commonly said that compulsory voting is a misnomer, since all that's usually required is turnout (i.e. people can come to the polling station and cross their names off without even taking a ballot paper).

Well, I can't speak for other countries, but it seems that in Australia it's actually voting that's required to fill your legal duty, even though (for obvious reasons to do with the secret ballot) no more than turnout is enforced. This position is stated by the Australian Electoral Commission here (page 4):

"The Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, under section 245(1), states:
"It shall be the duty of every elector to vote at each election".
• Under the Electoral Act, the actual duty of the elector is to attend a polling place, have their name marked off the certified list, receive a ballot paper and take it to an individual voting booth, mark it, fold the ballot paper and place it in the ballot box.
• It is not the case, as some people have claimed, that it is only compulsory to attend the polling place and have your name marked off, and this has been upheld by a number of legal decisions:
• High Court 1926 – Judd v McKeon (1926) 38 CLR 380
• Supreme Court of Victoria 1970 – Lubcke v Little [1970] VR 807
• High Court 1971 – Faderson v Bridger (1971) 126 CLR 271
• Supreme Court of Queensland 1974 – Krosch v Springbell; ex parte Krosch [1974] QdR 107
• ACT Supreme Court 1981 – O’Brien v Warden (1981) 37 ACTR 13"

Earthtone 9: Free Download

I completed my collection of the Earthtone 9 back catalogue about a year ago now. A nice nostalgia trip back to circa-2000 British metal. For anyone that missed out first time round though, they've released a best of collection that's available for free download here. Particularly recommended 'Tat Twam Asi' and 'Amnesia' (yes, I much preferred the later more melodic stuff).