The FA and Retrospective Punishment

Today it was announced that the FA would not take action against Callum McManaman for his tackle at the weekend. The BBC quotes the FA statement that "Where one of the officials has seen a coming together of players, no retrospective action should be taken, regardless of whether he or she witnessed the full or particular nature of the challenge. This is to avoid the re-refereeing of incidents".

So far, so good, but clearly this isn't a consistent line. Go back to September 2006 and Ben Thatcher's elbow on Pedro Mendes, as covered here. The BBC's own description of events ran "Manchester City defender Ben Thatcher has been suspended for eight games by the Football Association for elbowing Portsmouth midfield man Pedro Mendes.... Thatcher was only booked at the time by referee Dermot Gallagher".

Clearly, then, it's not unprecedented for the FA to take retrospective action, even when an official not only saw the incident but when punishment was meted out at the time. In fairness, the BBC story on the Thatcher case notes that because "of the severity of the incident, the FA circumvented its own rules to lodge a charge of "serious foul play" against Thatcher". Since that set a precedent, however, it's disingenuous of anyone to suggest that the FA could not have acted in the recent McManaman case, had they wanted to; the fact is that they chose not to.

(For the record, I've not seen the McManaman incident and am therefore agnostic as to whether it deserved retrospective punishment; my point is simply that the reasoning offered by the FA for not taking such action seems weak, given that they have done so before.)

MPs and Hypocrisy

There's a piece by the BBC on MPs' practice of abstaining by voting both for and against a bill, rather than not voting at all. It's a slightly odd practice, but it seems that some MPs at least think that it allows them to register views such as that they support a motion in principle but have reservations about the particular implementation before them. In fact, it's not clear that this abstention is any more articulate than silence, since it seems that sometimes the double vote can be due to a mistake.

I was struck by the following quotation, from Andrea Leadsom:

I find myself genuinely torn... I cannot vote against a measure that would mean so much to the minority of homosexual couples for whom marriage is the ultimate recognition for their genuine feelings for each other. Yet nor can I vote for a measure that risks centuries of faith based belief in marriage.

Remember, this is supposed to rationalise voting both for and against the gay marriage bill. First, she says that she cannot vote against it, though she did so. Then she says she cannot vote for it, though again she did so. True she might reasonably say she did not support the bill, nor oppose it, since by casting a vote either way her influence cancelled out. But she specifically says she could not vote either way, even though she did in fact vote both ways.

It's often said that to vote a particular way is to align oneself with it, which explains why people sometimes feel that they cannot vote a particular way with a clear conscience. Voting both ways isn't to align oneself unambiguously with either, but if voting sends any signal then she has to admit that she did vote for gay marriage (and against it). Perhaps, if she really felt that she couldn't vote either way, she shouldn't have voted at all.

Women in the NFL

Apparently, women are allowed to play in the NFL (American football). I'll have to remember this when teaching feminism later in the semester.

Co-Authorship in Philosophy

There's an interesting discussion of co-authorship over on Leiter's blog. (The discussion is primarily about what input counts as 'authorship' and how credit should be divided between authors, rather than how to go about it or whether it's a good idea.)

My own contribution was to suggest that perhaps we should think of the 'authors' credited in a paper as contributors, rather than authors in the traditional sense. This, I think, better captures some of the reasons for which we may think that someone deserves credit, even if they weren't actually involved in the writing of a paper.

Pistorius and Ordinary Language Philosophy

This story seems tragic for all concerned. I couldn't help but notice, however, that this BBC feature on reactions to the news says "Early media reports suggested that Mr Pistorius may have accidentally shot his girlfriend, believing her to be an intruder".

Anyone familiar with Austin's 'A Plea for Excuses' is likely to remember the famous footnote in which he distinguishes between mistakes and accidents. The details of the Pistorius case aren't fully clear, but it seems that he purposely shot the person in his house - it wasn't an accident, where the gun just went off in his hand. What occurred was a case of mistaken identity: what he thought was an intruder was actually his girlfriend, Reeva Steenkamp. He didn't intend to shoot her, but that makes the case a mistake, rather than an accident. Accidents just happen (befall), whereas mistakes depend on wrong choices.

Austin's distinction sounds plausible to me, but it's interesting (in this and other cases) to consider whether it describes a distinction implicit - albeit imperfectly observed - in ordinary language, or is simply a philosopher's stipulation about terms that, ordinarily, are interchangeable. The BBC's original story, however, does respect the distinction: "Reports say he may have mistaken her for a burglar".

EDL Link

I don't know how search algorithms work, but any little link helps I believe. The EDL I'm after is English Disco Lovers.

What Is 'A Song'?

It seems that BBC 6 Music recently produced a listener-voted poll of the Top 100 songs of the last ten years (the time the station has been in air). I'm not going to dispute the choices (de gustibus non est disputandum), but it did seem odd to me that the Top Ten included at least one cover version, specifically Johnny Cash's version of 'Hurt' (originally by Nine Inch Nails).

I don't know what the identity conditions, or ontological status, of a song are. But ordinarily I'd describe Cash's 'Hurt' as a new version of the same song, not as a new song. And, if it is the same song as the one NIN released in 1994, then it doesn't seem that it should be eligible.

Perhaps this is over-restrictive. Perhaps new (re)interpretations should be counted as new songs, rather than variations on old ones (though I don't think it's how we ordinarily speak). But, if this is so, I wonder how much has to change for the song to become a new one.

Nine Inch Nail's And All That Could Have Been live album was apparently released in March 2002, so also too long ago, but had that been a year later would that have counted as a new song of the last ten years? Taken to the extreme, is every new performance a new song? If so, I'd suggest that there are some real classics missing from this list of songs...

Sugar Tax

I read an interesting (unpublished) paper taking a Millian approach towards the taxing of unhealthy foods the other day. Turns out to be rather topical, since the BBC reports calls to raise tax on sugary drinks. I'm curious to know whether this would include orange juice, as well as cola, and why it shouldn't also include alcohol, on a calorific basis.

Revising Medal Tables

I mentioned in an earlier post that the London 2012 Olympic medal tables aren't finally final until 2020, since drug cheats can still be punished later. I see today that Lance Armstrong has just been stripped of a medal from Sydney 2000. This is actually even longer after the event than I thought possible.

Horse Burgers

It seems that scandal has erupted over the presence of horse meat in beefburgers. Apparently burgers sold as beef in fact contained both horse and pig meat. This is mentioned in the BBC report, but what I find strange is that the main focus seems to be given to the horse element.

I'd have thought it far worse that these burgers contain pig, given that many people have moral/religious objections to eating pork. No one, so far as I know, has any particular moral objection to eating horse (ethical vegetarians do of course object to eating horse but not horse in particular - they wouldn't eat beef either for the same reasons).

Of course it's true that horses aren't usually considered food in the UK, but there's no particular reason for this - I understand that the French happily eat horse meat. I think this highlights the somewhat arbitrary nature of what is and is not considered food, particularly when it comes to animals. (A further BBC feature follows this up, here.) But it's also surprising to see more focus here on what I take to be an aesthetic matter than a religious/moral one, given that most people usually hold the latter to be more important.

(Of course I don't mean to deny that there's a general objection here that consumers were misled about the content of what they were eating, which may be the most serious issue of all - but this doesn't explain the focus on horse meat.)

New Blog

I realised that I've been blogging here for over seven years. I never knew it would last so long when I first set out. Up until now, my blogging has been done exclusively here, barring the odd guest post (and Twitter, if that counts as blogging).

Recently I've created a new blog here. This new one isn't to replace this one. Whereas Praesidium is a personal blog with a fairly wide-remit, the new blog - as the name implies - is focused on organ policy. It's to tie-in with a grant I was recently awarded by the Royal Society of Edinburgh for a series of workshops on organ policy. If that's an area that interests you, then be sure to follow the Organ Policy blog for updates.

Incentives to Lose Weight

I hope that everyone had an enjoyable Christmas/New Year. Around now many people are probably starting new year diets in an effort to shift the extra holiday pounds. Apparently, however, Westminster Council are threatening to cut benefits for obese or unhealthy people who refuse to exercise (or lose weight?).

Long-time readers will no doubt be aware of my interest in incentives (click on the tag for more). This is a slightly unusual case. There seems, intuitively, to be a difference between cutting benefits and offering extra benefits. On the other hand, this also seems to be two ways of describing the same thing, so it may merely be a framing effect.

Referendum Cost

You may recall that one of the arguments used by the No2AV campaign against electoral reform was its cost. The costs were obviously misrepresented, since the supposed cost of the referendum was included as a cost of adopting AV, though it was a cost incurred whether or not AV was chosen. Today it emerges that the cost of the referendum was over-estimated in any case.

Gay Marriage

I saw this attack on gay marriage on Facebook. Since the comment I ended up writing (on FB, rather than the blog) was rather long, I thought I'd share it here too: I have to say I'm not at all convinced. First, marriage is not "the only relationship where children can be conceived and born within the life-long union of their own natural parents", since children can be born out of wedlock and their parents may still stay together. Second, even if this was distinctive to marriage, it would suggest that we need a word not for lifelong union of man and woman but rather lifelong union of man and woman raising their biological children, if that's what's so special. This isn't what marriage means, as the author concedes ("This doesn’t mean that a man and a woman are obliged to have children, or that they are always capable of having children.") These examples apparently don't dilute the meaning of marriage, since it's still the case that marriage 'ordinarily' means lifelong union of man and woman raising their biological children. But, if this is so, then I don't see why gay marriage is any threat, at least provided it's not so common as to change the 'ordinary' case. Then marriage ordinarily means lifelong union of man and woman raising their biological children, or relevantly similar cases, such as childless couples of either sex.

Alcohol Minimum Pricing

It looks as if England and Wales could follow the Scottish lead and introduce minimum pricing for alcohol. I have a paper, which should be published soon, that outlines a Millian perspective on the issue. (No link yet, but I'll probably post again when it becomes available.) In short, I argue that Mill would have opposed minimum pricing as a means to discourage drinking, though he would have been happy with a tax on alcohol for purposes of raising revenue.

Tied Elections Decided by Lottery (Again)

Apparently when US elections aren't decided by the Supreme Court - or the popular vote - they use various lottery mechanisms to break ties, as in this case of New Mexico state house. Thanks to Peter Stone for the link.

Plural Voting

Next week the Mill seminar that I've been running this semester reaches Considerations on Representative Government (included in Gray's On Liberty and Other Essays, which is the set text for my course). Anyone with passing familiarity with this work will know that one of Mill's most (in)famous recommendations is a system of plural voting, according to which the poor and uneducated (although not those living on welfare benefits or the illiterate) would get one vote, but other more educated citizens would get more than one vote.

This idea generally strikes students as repulsive - correctly so, perhaps - but one point I try to stress is that, at Mill's time, this was a progressive proposal. In other words, he was not advocating taking away anyone's vote (as a proposal with the same content would today), but extending the vote. He wanted to give the less educated some power, which seems a clear improvement on none. (Though I can see why someone firmly committed to political equality might think it better not to go down this road.)

This Wikipedia entry is remarkably interesting though. It was not until the 1948 Representation of the People Act (first applied in the 1950 general election) that the UK abolished plural voting. Belgium also practised plural voting, something like what Mill proposed, between 1894 and 1919, apparently to limit the impact of universal suffrage. In practice, universal unequal suffrage may be a stepping stone towards universal equal suffrage, rather than a step away from it.

Expanding the Franchise

The BBC carries a couple of recent sort regarding extension of voting rights.

This one refers to European rulings to the effect that a blanket ban on human rights contravenes human rights. The idea of giving some people, serving minor sentences, the vote doesn't seem so terrible to me. Indeed, given that we only have General Elections every 4-5 years, one could say it's unfair that some people serving a two year sentence will get to vote while others won't, simply because of when the election happens to fall in relation to their sentence. Perhaps this consideration could guide a distinction between those that do and do not lose their voting rights - i.e. anyone serving four years or fewer should still get to vote. But this isn't something I've given much thought to.

This piece covers the debate around extending voting rights to those aged 16 or 17, as the SNP proposes for the Scottish Independence Referendum. It's interesting to hear (or read) arguments on both sides, but I think some deserve commenting on.

Grant Costello argues that we allow 16 year olds to make important decisions, such as getting married. This is true, but doesn't necessarily mean we should allow them to vote: we might think they should be allowed to make (potentially bad) decisions over their own lives, but aren't fit to be trusted with power over others. (He does mention starting families, but aside from non-identity type reasons to deny that this harms the child, we can presumably trust to natural parental inclinations here.)

Philip Cowley argues that those aged 16 or 17 can often only exercise rights, such as to get married, with parental permission. This is interesting, but not necessarily enough to support his position. We could say that these teenagers should be able to vote with parental permission then (and, without permission, from age 18). Or we could argue that electoral outcomes will depend on 16 and 17 year olds in conjunction with their elders.

Electoral Reform

A while back - over the summer in fact - I attended a People's Gathering in Edinburgh organised by the Electoral Reform Society. I found it a pretty eye-opening day. True those involved, being self-selected, weren't truly representative of the general population, but I was surprised to find so many people on the same page regarding various political matters. A report on the day has finally emerged here. (For the record, I was definitely one of those calling for a decline in political parties.)

Alcohol Policy

I've been meaning to blog about this for a while. Apparently researchers have predicted that minimum pricing for alcohol could save lives. (Interestingly, one consequence of my delay is that I see the estimated figure was reduced from 50,000 to 11,500 on 28th September!)

These calculations are fraught with difficulty and I'm no social scientist, so I'm just going to accept these claims. What I find noticeable, however, is the seemingly implicit assumption that this would be a reason to introduce minimum pricing throughout the UK. It's not clear that this follows, even if the empirical predictions are correct.

I don't think the state should ban alcohol, even though it leads to deaths, so it's not clear that it should so restrict it either. (Certain restrictions, particularly regarding age, are, of course, appropriate.) For those interested, there's a forthcoming special issue of Contemporary Social Science on Alcohol, Public Policy and Social Science (see the call for papers here), in which I have a paper developing a Millian liberal view of minimum pricing. (I argue that Mill would be against it.)

Surprising Political Facts

1) Scotland operates five different electoral systems. Details here.

2) The Prince of Wales can veto Westminster legislation, according to this article (which is chiefly concerned with his revenue).

Disenfranchising Non-Taxpayers

It seems that the idea of disenfranchising those who don't pay tax has reared its head again. Of course, I should have lots to say about such a proposal, but (aside from anything else) I'm busy right now preparing for a PhD viva on Friday, so I'll confine myself to observing that Hayek was not the first nor, in my estimation, the most famous philosopher to propose something along these lines. As I mention in my comment on the afore-linked blog, J. S. Mill made similar proposals in his Considerations on Representative Government.

Facebook on Organ Donation

Activity here has been sparse due to the double whammy of the start of semester and travel (York and St Andrews), but here's a quick post to note that I was quoted (albeit not really saying anything significant) in this feature on the Canadian blog Science-ish, on Facebook's attempts to increase organ donation.

New Blog / Page 3

It's been a while since I updated my Blogroll - in fact, I still haven't - but I'd like to call attention to the new blog, Slave of the Passions, by my friend Becca. The first two posts have been really interesting. In particular, this one on Page 3, provoked such a lengthy comment from me that I thought it worth posting over here as a comment in its own right:

Point 1 [the harm complained of is not any to the models, who partake voluntarily, but to other women] is pretty obvious, especially to anyone familiar with the harm principle (though apparently not to defenders of Page 3, hence the need to state it). I might add, in the spirit of Mill, that institutions such as Page 3 may be harmful to men as well as women. I don’t choose to live in a world with Page 3 either, and it distorts people’s perceptions (perhaps even mine) of women *and* men (am I not masculine if I don’t want to ogle over Page 3?).

On the other hand, I have a worry that this line of argument can be a threat to liberty. For practically anything, someone can complain ‘I don’t choose to live in a society where that kind of thing goes on, and alters people’s attitudes’. Anti-gay religious types, for instance, may claim that their marriages are harmed by homosexuals, because homosexuality changes the meaning of marriage in ways that they do not endorse. Can we find a principled reason why the dispersed harm to women in general seems like a reason for interference, while harm to religious conservatives does not?

Perhaps, however, this point is unnecessary, given your point 3 [the petition is not calling for a ban, but for the Sun Editor to voluntarily stop publishing Page 3, hence it is not illiberal censorship]. If there was a harm, then it could justify censorship. But, if this isn’t censorship, then harm isn’t necessary.

This brings me to point 3, which is really interesting, but I’m not sure it’s quite adequate as stated. A Millian liberal recognises that freedom can be restricted by both state and society. If the Sun editor is cowed into not publishing Page 3 by social pressure, then that could be considered civil society censorship, even if no law is involved. I think we need to distinguish between the campaign successfully persuading him of the error of his ways and it failing to change his attitudes but nonetheless leading him to stop publishing because of social pressure. The latter could, I think, be considered censorship. I take it that your real aim is the former, which I agree is morally unproblematic, but it’s important to distinguish the two.

CFP: ALSP conference 2013 (Stirling)

Association for Legal and Social Philosophy
2013 Annual Conference: 24th-25th June

Division of Law and Philosophy, School of Arts and Humanities, University of Stirling, Scotland
Local organisers: Ben Saunders and Rowan Cruft

Keynote plenary speakers:
Bob Goodin (ANU/Essex)
Serena Olsaretti (ICREA-Pompeu Fabra/Cambridge)

Theme: Combining Theory and Practice
Papers are welcome in any substantive area of legal, social, or political philosophy (justice, democracy, rights, liberalism, communitarianism, punishment, etc) and from any philosophical methodological approach, but we particularly welcome those addressing the conference theme. These may be primarily either theoretical or practical in nature, but should seek to connect or combine the theoretical and the practical realms. They might, for instance, demonstrate how theoretical contributions can inform practice or illustrate how practice (and empirical study of practice) has implications for theory.
Both individual papers and proposals for panels on related topics are welcome.

Please send paper/panel proposals to alsp2013@stir.ac.uk by 14th January 2013. Submissions should consist of a title and 400-500 word abstract (for each paper, in the case of panels). These may be sent in the body of the email or as an attachment (.doc, .docx, .pdf), but please ensure that they are prepared for blind review (i.e. author’s name and affiliation should appear in your email but not with the abstract).

Any queries can be directed to Ben Saunders (ben.saunders) and/or Rowan Cruft (rowan.cruft), followed by @stir.ac.uk .

Representation: Local or National?

There's an interesting piece on the BBC website (here) asking whether MPs should resign their constituency representation when appointed ministers. The suggestion is that the functions of government might conflict with representing a local constituency.

I think that this is a really interesting topic, but the 'solution' proposed by the BBC doesn't seem - to me - to go far enough. I think the problem is not confined to government ministers; rather the problem is the system of local representation as a whole.

Burke famously argued that MPs were to represent the nation as a whole, rather than their electors. John Stuart Mill agreed, endorsing a proposal for proportional representation (devised by Thomas Hare) that would effectively abolish local constituencies, arguing that what mattered was representing people, rather than places.

Much more recently, Andrew Rehfeld analysed the same problem (in his book, The Concept of Constituency), pointing out that representatives are typically torn between pursing the national interest (as they should, as legislators) and local, partisan interests, resulting in 'pork barrel' politics. His proposed solution was to make representatives accountable to the national interest, by abolishing geographically-defined constituencies and having each representative elected by a random cross-section of the population, the interest of which should coincide with that of the whole.

Rehfeld's proposal has merit, if you want each elector to be able to point to a particular representative and say 's/he is my representative'. Personally, I'm not sure that's necessary. I'd be happy for the whole country to be treated as a single constituency (as in Israel). I don't see why localities need to be represented as such. After all, other interest groups - such as occupations - don't generally get this special treatment (though some groups do or have had it).

I'm not saying that local government should be abolished. In fact, I'm all in favour of it. My point is that particularly local issues should be left to local government. The role of representatives in parliament ought to be to consider the national interest and this isn't obviously served by having them drawn from localities (not least because of the disproportionality that tends to result from elections in single-member constituencies).

Stylish Academic Writing?

I've noticed that Helen Sword's recent book, Stylish Academic Writing, seems to have caused something of a stir - as evidenced by this advert-masquerading-as-news in Times Higher Education. While I don't think it's without merit, I think the praise is somewhat over the top. A longer review is, hopefully, coming soon (not in an academic venue), but in the meantime you can find my thoughts in my review on Amazon.

Solidarity in Bioethics

I have a piece published in the current (Sept 2012) issue of Bioethics, a special issue devoted to 'Solidarity in Bioethics'. The good news is that the whole issue is currently freely available without subscription here. I'm told that this will last throughout September. Here's the abstract for my piece:

ABSTRACT

Proposals for increasing organ donation are often rejected as incompatible with altruistic motivation on the part of donors. This paper questions, on conceptual grounds, whether most organ donors really are altruistic. If we distinguish between altruism and solidarity – a more restricted form of other-concern, limited to members of a particular group – then most organ donors exhibit solidarity, rather than altruism. If organ donation really must be altruistic, then we have reasons to worry about the motives of existing donors. However, I argue that altruism is not necessary, because organ donation supplies important goods, whatever the motivation, and we can reject certain dubious motivations, such as financial profit, without insisting on altruism.

Once solidaristic donation is accepted, certain reforms for increasing donation rates seem permissible. This paper considers two proposals. Firstly, it has been suggested that registered donors should receive priority for transplants. While this proposal appears based on a solidaristic norm of reciprocity, it is argued that such a scheme would be undesirable, since non-donors may contribute to society in other ways. The second proposal is that donors should be able to direct their organs towards recipients that they feel solidarity with. This is often held to be inconsistent with altruistic motivation, but most donation is not entirely undirected in the first place (for instance, donor organs usually go to co-nationals). While allowing directed donation would create a number of practical problems, such as preventing discrimination, there appears to be no reason in principle to reject it.

Is Fairness Hard-Wired?

A couple of recent papers in PLOS One - available here and here - find evidence of fairness-based behaviour in young children. Thanks to Chris Bertram for pointing me towards the BBC story.

Chimpanzee Lotteries

As we know by now, anything that varies depending upon where you live is a 'postcode lottery'. The term is generally used to condemn regional differences in healthcare provision or other services. I think that this is unfortunate as it tends to give lotteries a bad name.

One problem is that there is no real lottery here, or at least not one between already existing people. This relates to a second problem, that those who criticise these inequalities do not usually go on to notice that simply be born in the UK with a National Health Service, rather than in, say, Ethiopia is also morally arbitrary.

Anyway, I didn't want to embark on another lottery rant; my reason for posting is to note that chimpanzees are now subject to postcode lotteries, even though they don't even have postcode...

Olympic Medals and Lexical Ordering

Those familiar with Rawls's political philosophy will no doubt be familiar with the notion of lexical (or lexographical) ordering, the standard example of which is dictionary alphabetisation. Football league tables offer another example, usually with points scored lexically prior to goal difference, which is in turn lexically prior to goals scored.

I thought it worth noting that the Olympic medals table offers another fine example. For some particularly clear examples:
South Korea (13/8/7) comes 5th, ahead of Germany (11/19/14).
Kazakhstan (7/1/5) comes 12th, ahead of Netherlands (6/6/8).
North Korea (4/0/2) comes 20th, ahead of Spain (3/10/4).
Norway (2/1/1) comes 35th, ahead of Canada (1/5/12).
And, just to show that silver medals carry some weight, Australia (7/16/12) comes 10th, ahead of Japan (7/14/17).

It's a further question, of course, whether this lexical ordering is justified. Does one gold medal really outweigh any number of silvers?

I'm told by Canadian friends that Canadian reporting switched from using the lexical ordering to reporting the total number of medals, a measure on which Canada (36th) came ahead of Hungary (9th, with 8/4/5). This doesn't seem right either, since it counts a gold as being as good as (but no better than) a bronze.

Perhaps a better ordering would be one giving differential weight to different medals, but this (unlike either lexical ordering or equality) requires us to specify how much better gold is than bronze. If we were to say gold = 3 points, silver = 2 points, bronze = 1 point then we would get one result; but we'd get a quite different table if we said gold = 5 points, silver = 3 points, bronze = 1 point. (If that's not clear, compare two countries with the profiles (1/0/0) and (0/2/0) under each of these schemes.)

p.s. This is based on the table after the immediate conclusion of the games. Apparently the medal standings won't be absolutely final until 2020! (Maybe even longer: see update here.)

Exam Results and University Entry

Two Scottish universities (St Andrews and Robert Gordon) have apparently been guilty of leaking exam results to some of their incoming students ahead of their official publication. (These are presumably Scottish Highers, but the same principles apply to A-Levels.)

What stands out to me is the fact that universities have these results so far ahead of the candidates themselves. I see that there's need for universities to be able to process offers before clearing, but I don't see why candidates should be kept in the dark.

What we have at the moment amounts to this (random dates):
4th - universities get results
11th - candidates get results
11th - clearing begins
I would have thought a much better system would be like this:
4th - universities get results
4th - candidates get results
11th - clearing begins

In other words, universities can still have the same amount of time to process grades, finalize offers, and work out how many clearing places they have, but candidates should know where they stand during this period. Those who've missed their grades will have an agonising wait for clearing to begin, but at least they'll know their grades and have time to think over and consider options, rather than having to make important decisions immediately after receiving disappointing exam results.

Measuring - and Reporting - Happiness

While I'm doubtful that the government can directly boost people's happiness, and wary of any attempts at its trying to do so, I do welcome recent moves towards policies aimed at improving well-being, rather than economic growth. As I argued in my last post, money is only means to an end, not an end in itself. I'd rather be poor and happy than rich and miserable.

It seems that the Office for National Statistics has recently published figures showing how happy we are. Sadly, even the BBC's coverage leaves a lot to be desired. First, I read this story, which says: "When broken down, Northern Ireland had the lowest life satisfaction rating - 21.9% - compared with 24.3% for England, 25.3% for Wales and 22.6% for Scotland."

It's not clear exactly what those figures mean, but on reading this other story it seems that they are completely misleading, since the latter article says: "People in Wales and England are less satisfied with their lives than people in Scotland and Northern Ireland ... England and Wales had similar proportion of adults giving a low rating for "life satisfaction" - 24.3% and 25.3% respectively. There were fewer people with low life satisfaction in Scotland (22.6%) and Northern Ireland (21.6%)"

In other words, the two articles give directly contradictory information using the same statistics: a fine example of innumerate journalism...

Seeing Beyond the Economic?

A lot has been made of the (potential) economic benefits that the Olympics are set to bring, not only to London but the whole of the UK. Even Scotland, it is claimed, will receive a sizeable economic boost. Moreover, it was recently announced that Sunday trading laws would be temporarily suspended in England and Wales, to allow shops to benefit from increased custom during the games.

It's difficult of course to quantify the economic benefits that may result from the Olympics, since it won't be clear whether particular contracts are due to the games or not or how the economy would have fared had the games not taken place. This has led some to question whether the benefits will be as significant as some (such as the government) claim - or, in other words, whether the money spent on the Olympics is really a worthwhile investment. Even if the Olympics do turn a profit, could that money have been better invested, say in infrastructure improvements?

Unfortunately I can't find a link to this, but it was somewhat gratifying this afternoon to hear a spokeperson on the radio saying, in effect, that even if the economic benefits of the games are negligible, they may be a good way of spending public money if people enjoy them. While I'm not sure myself that they are the best way to spend public money, it's pleasing to hear someone take a non-instrumentalist viewpoint.

Not everything we do ought to be driven towards making more and more money. Money ought to be a means to an end, not an end in itself. Indeed, if the only point of making money was to make more money then it would be arguably without a point - the point is that we can spend it to acquire other things that we value. Thus we ought to recognize that there are things that are worth spending money on, whether or not they produce an economic return.

If this thinking were to receive more recognition, then politicians might come to apply similar reasoning to education. Presently they almost invariably focus on providing the skills necessary for the economy, but education ought to do more than that: it ought to be something that is worth spending money on, rather than simply a means to making money.

Cruft on Leveson

As I write, my colleague Rowan Cruft is being interviewed by the Leveson inquiry - live streaming here. (This should, I understand, continue to be available later.)

Biased Coins

I've come to quite like Richard Wiseman's Friday puzzles - though sometimes the answer's obvious and sometimes it's a rather infuriating trick question. This recent one, on how to choose randomly with a biased coin, is of course right up my street. Richard's answer was posted here. Clever, but I (and others) think that this was cleverer than needed, given the set up of the question. I explain why in my comment here. I think epistemic randomness is sufficient here, so only one toss is needed.

Don't Panic

Afraid posting's been slow because, between work and watching football/tennis, I've been rather busy of late, but I thought I'd just put in a quick plug for Hitchhiker's Guide to the Galaxy and Philosophy, in which I co-authored a chapter. Note that this is published by Palgrave-Macmillan, rather than one of the usual popular philosophy publishers (like Open Court), but it is of much the same ilk - a lighthearted introduction to some philosophical issues raised in/by/through Douglas Adams' HHGTTG.

A Liberal Decalogue

I just saw Bertrand Russell's ten commandments of teaching, which strike me as the kind of thing that ought to be promulgated more widely.

I was particularly struck by number four: "When you meet with opposition, even if it should be from your husband or your children, endeavor to overcome it by argument and not by authority, for a victory dependent upon authority is unreal and illusory." Given that this list was first published in 1951, it surprised me that it seems to be addressed to women.

What Money Can't Buy

I've just posted a short (400 word) review of Michael Sandel's What Money Can't Buy over on Amazon.

I should say that the review is written for the book's popular audience, rather than professional philosophers. If I were reviewing it for an academic journal (and I do intend to write a longer, if not more academic, review at some point), then I would probably be a bit harsher about the lack of real argumentation.

Sandel's message is simply that we need to think about the appropriate limits of markets, but he doesn't explicitly put forward his own recommendations, preferring to fall back on the idea that they are a matter for public debate. Nor does he demonstrate that markets do corrupt other practices in a way that would convince someone who does not accept this. The appeal to social understandings - as with Walzer's Spheres of Justice - is essentially an appeal to intuitions that may be contested.

Nonetheless, as popular philosophy I think the book works well. While one can detect continuities with Sandel's other works, and implicit criticisms of Rawls-style universalist liberalism (particularly in Sandel's emphasis that public debate should draw upon moral visions of the good life), none of this is necessary. It's accessibly written and something that I hope gets widely read. To say that anything that brings political philosophy to a wider audience would be an exaggeration (in case, for instance, it was really bad), but this I think is an admirable popularisation of ideas developed elsewhere (for instance by Walzer and Satz).

Pots and Kettles

Last week I (at least implicitly) criticized the SNP, for condemning a Labour-Conservative coalition in Stirling. In the interests of party balance then, I should mention that today I saw this piece on the BBC, which reveals that Labour were the largest single party in Dumfries and Galloway (15 seats) but have been ousted by an SNP-Conservative coalition (10 and 14 seats respectively). The interesting point is that Labour group leader Ronnie Nicholson is quoted as saying "The Tories lost the election, and the people of Dumfries and Galloway voted to kick them out. But the dead hand of Tory rule has been given the kiss of life by the SNP." The irony is that these words - such as the dead hand reference - echo what the SNP said about the Labour coalition in Stirling.

So, if there is any merit to this claim, then the Labour group from Dumfries and Galloway are implicitly criticizing the Stirling Labour Party, while the SNP from Stirling are criticizing the SNP from Dumfries and Galloway...

Organ Donation in the News

The other day I had an email from Toronto-based journalist Julia Belluz, asking some questions about organ donation (a topic I've previously written on). Her article, featuring quotes from me, has now appeared on her Science-ish blog at Macleans.ca.

The Logic of Proportional Representation

I commented last week on the Scottish local council elections. As it turns out, the results in Stirling were rather interesting: SNP: 9, Labour: 8, Conservative: 4, Green: 1.

No party had a majority (over half of the 22 seats). But in today's news I see that the Labour and Conservative Parties (12 seats between them) have agreed to enter a coalition. (This makes a change from the SNP minority council that's been in charge from 2008 until now.)

I was struck by the reported reaction of the SNP:
"Graham Houston of the SNP ... said: "The people of Stirling will be shocked that the Tories and Labour will get together to form an administration on Stirling Council, despite neither party being the biggest party after Thursday's election ... The real losers will be the people of the Stirling Council area, who after rejecting Labour at the ballot box will nonetheless see Labour entrenched at the helm of Stirling Council ... The people of Stirling will rightly feel betrayed by this treacherous Labour/Tory alliance.""

It seems that this statement is either downright misleading or portrays a lack of understanding of the electoral system. The elections were held under STV, a form of proportional representation. The simple idea is that the party or parties with a majority of seats thereby represent the majority of voters.

Ok, it's true that no one voted for a Labour-Conservative coalition, but the Labour and Conservative councillors between them represent more people than the SNP alone. It's not clear in what sense he can say that the people of Stirling rejected Labour, except in so far as Labour failed to win a majority, but that is true also of the SNP.

Simply being the largest single party does not give one the right to govern. Suppose we had one centre-right party with 40% support and two centre-left parties each with 30% support. Here we should expect the latter two to form a coalition government and, in doing so, they would be representing the majority of the people.

Disclaimer: I don't know the exact breakdown of the vote in Stirling, nor how the redistribution of preferences went to arrive at the final outcome, but the difference between SNP (9 seats) and Labour (8 seats) could be negligible. Even if it's not, the above points still stand. Proportional representation is intended to realize majority rule, whereas non-proportional systems of representation allow sizable minorities to wield disproportionate power.

Paid to Quit

Apparently a study in Dundee found that people who were paid incentives to stop smoking were more likely to succeed in giving up. Since the incentive was not the only help provided, it's not necessarily the case that it was the effective element, but it does seem to do some good. Interesting, I suppose, given that it requires some capacity for delayed gratification.

Electoral System Watch

I've just finished teaching my module on Democratic Theory. When discussing the plurality run-off method, I used French presidential elections as my example, though there voting takes place in two distinct stages. It seems, however, that the London mayoral elections use the plurality run-off method, as the BBC report here:

"With no candidate set to get 50% of votes, the top two go into a second round, where the second choices of those who voted for the five eliminated candidates are reallocated."

In related news, local elections were also held in Scotland, using the STV method (see the end of this report on results or this Q&A).

Readers may remember that I backed the 'Yes to AV' campaign in our recent referendum on electoral reform. Though there are some problems with AV, I think the three main arguments that swung the referendum were: i) under AV the 'loser' wins; ii) under AV some people get more votes; and iii) AV is too complicated/expensive. I don't think any of those arguments are good ones, and the links given will take you to my rebuttals of the first two. But the interesting point is that all of those arguments apply at least as well to STV, but I don't hear anyone round here complaining about it...

Lectureship in Environmental Politics @ Stirling

Fancy being my colleague? Work in environmental politics and policy? More details here.

Stirling Research in the News

We've been thinking lately about REF submissions and impact statements. It's nice to report that I've seen research from the University of Stirling featured in two recent BBC stories: First, research on the Curriculum for Excellence in schools. Second, news that even mild exercise, such as a brisk walk, can help combat depression. Now we just need to encourage the BBC to report more on research in philosophy...

Leiter Philosophy Journals Poll

I've reported before on various journal rankings, so I thought it worth noting that Brian Leiter is running a new poll via his blog (voting form here) seeking to identify the best 'general' philosophy journals. I've been thinking that I should probably send some of my work to such general journals, rather than the specialist political philosophy journals, so I'll certainly be keeping an eye out for the results.

Fish in Trees

I assume many people have seen the Einstein quote about fish climbing trees meme. Well, here's an amusing little feature from The Onion that reminded me of it. According to the (hoax) story, scientists have found that dolphins perform less well in a variety of intelligence tests on land and in fact even exhibit a negative learning curve! Yes, I know dolphins aren't actually fish. Still, in conjunction perhaps these two pieces remind us that a lot of what we consider 'intelligence' is really contextual and that someone who performs well in one set of conditions may not do so well had certain features of their environment been different. The kind of lesson situationist psychology has been teaching, to say nothing of quasi-Rawlsian scepticism about talent and desert.

University Competition

The point of allowing a (limited) market in the higher education sector, I thought, was that competition would drive up academic standards. As those familiar with the US would attest, however, the problem with this is that the consumers in question (students) don't necessarily respond to academic standards in their spending decisions: rather, their money goes to the universities offering the best 'student experience'. Thus, we see universities competing to offer the best accommodation, sports teams, or even nightlife, rather than well-stocked libraries or knowledgeable teachers (things that, even if would-be students were interested in, they would not be in a position to assess). This point is not original to me, but I notice that it seems that these predictions are being borne out as universities seek to build plush campus hotels, at the same time as making cuts to academic budgets and offering staff another below-inflation pay 'rise'...

Joint Sessions

The 2012 Joint Sessions (of the Mind Association and Aristotelian Society) will be held in Stirling this July. This is the UK's biggest professional philosophy conference. The website has just gone live and registration will soon be open (from 1st April). On that note: (fairly hefty) late registration fee will apply after the end of May. I should also encourage delegates to pay by debit, rather than credit, cards where possible: although the cost to the delegate is the same, credit cards incur a processing fee which means we lose money that would otherwise have gone to a registered charity (i.e. University of Stirling - and through us also to the Mind Association and Aristotelian Society).

Hiatus

Eek, it's been over a month since my last post. I've not been abducted by aliens, or given up blogging, but I have in that intervening time bought a house (and moved in to it). Normal service should be resumed shortly...

Lotteries Are Gambling

I happened to glance through the Metro today, whilst waiting for an appointment, and noticed a feature on lotteries. It actually draws on Prof Mark Griffiths, from Nottingham Trent University, to deliver this shocking statement "Prof Griffiths believes lotteries are a form of gambling". I wonder if that counts as impact?

CRGS Tops Table

I'm pleased to see that my old secondary school, Colchester Royal Grammar School, has topped A-level league tables for the sixth year running.

Downsizing Lottery

A US Court once judged that, where there were too many people at sea for lifeboats, places should be allocated randomly (United States v Holmes, reported in this paper by John Broome). No, this post isn't about the recent Costa Concordia disaster - where the captain apparently tripped and fell into a lifeboat, without a lottery - but rather about the recent news that street cleaners in Edinburgh were downsized by lottery. This has, it seems, proven controversial and the workers in question have apparently been reinstated until a more acceptable basis can be found to determine who to lay off. Odd, I think, that a lottery should be a fair way to make life-or-death decisions, but not to decide who suffers the fate of unemployment...

Football B Teams

So Andrea Villas-Boas has apparently suggested that Premier League teams be allowed to field reserve/B teams in the lower leagues. And it seems that David Moyes even tried to register an Everton reserve side in the Conference. Didn't Benitez suggest this kind of thing years ago (to some criticism, even ridicule)? Of course, that several people share an idea doesn't mean it's necessarily a good one, but it seems to work on Spain. Perhaps it's worth some debate...

Selling Votes

John Holbo has an interesting post on buying and selling votes over on Crooked Timber. Not many comments yet, but hopefully it will provoke a debate that's worth following...

Peer Review

I've just been updating my CV and, in the process, took a tally of the number of articles I'd reviewed each year. I didn't keep careful records but, by my reckoning, in 2008 (the year I completed my doctorate) I reviewed one article, in 2009 I reviewed four articles, in 2010 I reviewed 8 articles, and last year (2011) I reviewed 15 articles and a book manuscript. So far this year, I've already reviewed one article and committed to two more. Is this going to be an exponentially growing demand upon my time I wonder?

A Conversation on Philosophy

The blog's been awfully quiet lately, with me being busy with marking and then away for Christmas and New Year (though the fact that it no longer reaches readers via Facebook is also a downside), but here's an interesting report of a conversation about the nature and value of philosophy, pitched towards a 'layperson'.

100% Pie

PHD Comics - which I've previously described as Dilbert for graduate students - doesn't seem to get updated as often these days. Not that it's moribund, but rather than Jorge Cham is busy with various other projects, including a movie based on the comic and international appearances. Bit of a shame really.

Anyway there's a new strip yesterday, which I found deeply dissatisfying. It's not that I don't get the point, but I'm surprised that science PhD students would produce such inept pie charts. This information isn't at all appropriate for pie charts, because the categories aren't exclusive. A show on National Geographic might be debunking myths about dinosaurs, for instance. Even worse, I can't comprehend only 45% of programmes on The Science Channel being either about science or not about science. I'd fail an undergraduate who produced these graphs...

Quoted on Amazon

I have, in my time, written a fair few reviews on Amazon, particularly of music and books. Today, however, I found that a review I wrote elsewhere is quoted on Amazon. Here's the book in question.

The Amazon product description quotes me as follows:
""....This book brings together ten very different contributions, each of which illuminates the essay’s continuing interest.... while several essays would be accessible and useful to undergraduate students, the collection as a whole is aimed primarily at researchers, or at least more advanced students.... for those with an adequate background, this collection forms a fine introduction to some central interpretive debates around On Liberty."
--Philosophy in Review, Ben Saunders, The University of Stirling"

My original review can be found here (open access). I'm incorrectly credited as Benjamin Saunders in the journal contents, but thankfully not on Amazon!

Imported Notes

Judging by the comments I get, it seems that far more people view this blog via Facebook than actually visit the blog itself. Unfortunately, Facebook are withdrawing the facility that automatically imports blog posts as notes.

"You currently automatically import content from your website or blog into your Facebook notes. Starting November 22nd, this feature will no longer be available, although you'll still be able to write individual notes."

This policy seemed surprising at first, given that Facebook seems to want to take over one's whole internet experience. I did think that maybe it was because Blogspot was owned by Google, but as far as I know this policy applies to all blogs and not only Blogspot.

I may post blog posts manually to my Facebook wall, but we'll see how it goes...

Russia Bans Emos

Too bad my module on Mill is almost over (last lecture this afternoon), because I just came across this story - from 2008 - about Russia attempting to ban emo kids. It looks like a great example of unjustified state interference in individual freedom.

In fact, according to the report "The new bill describes "emos" as 12-16 year-olds with black and pink clothing, studded belts, painted fingernails, ear and eyebrow piercings, and black hair with fringes", which means adults are presumably free to dress as they wish. Since Mill's 'harm principle' only applies to those in the maturity of their faculties, and arguably not to those aged 12-16, this isn't technically contrary to his principle. But it's still a nice example. I wonder what became of this bill. Does anyone know?

Ps and Qs (Reposted)

I tried this before, but didn't get any comments - perhaps because I think there was some Facebook problem at the time (posts here are imported onto Facebook and I get most of my comments that way) - so I thought I'd try again...

Something I've just been thinking about and want a second opinion on. (It's not anything I'm working on, just a thought sparked by something I was reading.)

Suppose we have two propositions, P and Q. P is true. Q is a more extreme version of P. Does it follow that Q is false? Or that we have reason to believe P rather than Q?

I think much depends on the content of these propositions and the way in which Q is more extreme than P. For instance:

P: Abortion is usually wrong.
Q: Abortion is always wrong.

Here P allows (though does not logically imply) that some abortions are not wrong, which Q doesn't. If it's the case that some abortions are permissible, then Q is false and we have reason not to believe it.

But one problem is that P, while true, might be under inclusive. For instance:

P: Abortion is always wrong after 30 weeks.
Q: Abortion is always wrong after 28 weeks.

Stipulate that Q is true. Then it follows that P is true also, because P is weaker. That Q is more extreme than P does not make it false, because it is true (by stipulation), even though P is also true. Someone who believes P believes truly, but they also have reason to adopt the more extreme position Q. (Because P is true, but not the whole truth.)

I think this counter example works, but it depends of course on P not being the whole truth. I'm wondering if there are other counter examples. I suspect, perhaps, there may be some in which the way that Q is more extreme than P is practically irrelevant. These would seem, at least, cases where though Q is actually less correct, there is no harm in moving from the correct belief P to the not entirely correct belief Q, given that Q entails P.

Thoughts and comments welcome...

Organ Donation in Wales

A touching story today in Scotland about a young boy's organs being donated after his death in a road accident. This story reminded me of recent debates around 'presumed consent' in Wales.

Judging by BBC reports, I'm not clear what's actually being proposed. Yesterday I read this piece, in which they report:
The Welsh government has told the BBC Wales Politics Show that it is planning a system of "soft" presumed consent where family members would still be consulted after a person's death.

But 'consultation' does not amount to a veto. In fact, from today's news it seems that the family will not have any right to veto donation, i.e. the proposal is actually 'hard' presumed consent:
Families would have no legal right to stop dead relatives' organs being used for transplant if the person has not opted out in advance, under a proposed Welsh law.

This is an issue I've written on before. See my previous article in the Journal of Medical Ethics and a forthcoming piece here.

I think it's important that the public debate move on from talking about 'presumed consent', which generates unnecessary and unhelpful controversy. An opt-out scheme can be justified on various other grounds, such as 'normative consent, 'tacit consent', or even by the claim that consent is not necessary at all. We'd be better able to debate the merits of the proposal if we weren't hung up on arguments about presumptions.

Eating English

It's not often the English diet can be held up as a healthy example, but compared to Scottish food it is... Interesting findings, but I'm not sure the 'fat tax' is a good idea personally, possibly because I've been reading a lot of Mill this semester.

PGR SASP

It seems that the St Andrews/Stirling Program (SASP) has slipped to 3rd in the UK according to the latest Philosophical Gourmet Report preview. This is a bit of a shame, having been 2nd in the last two. No doubt it is in part due to some senior retirements in both departments, with new appointments at St Andrews not yet announced (at least at the time of the surveys).

Giving What We Might Be Able To

One Oxford undergraduate was so inspired by Toby Ord that he has apparently pledged to donate 10% of his future earnings to charity.

Given that he's assuming he'll be earning £40k/year, and the 10% is taken after student loans (not clear about other deductions), that should still leave him fairly well-off. Nonetheless, I think we have good reason to praise those doing more than most, even if we think they're doing less than perhaps they ought. The amount that this one person gives over the course of his life, assuming he keeps his pledge, will do a lot of good.

I wonder if that counts as research impact?

Incest in an Elevator

The other day one of my seminar groups spent a good half hour discussing whether a Millian state could prohibit incest. It's actually an example I've used myself in lectures (though not this year). For what it's worth, I think the answer is no: such interference would presumably be moralistic (or perhaps paternalistic) - it's unclear that it could count as harmful since, even if a deformed child is born as a result, that child would not have otherwise existed (and therefore cannot be harmed) and, in any case, no child need result, so at most the state should prohibit incestuous couples producing children, rather than incestuous relationships per se.

It seems that, while our state may be more liberal than in Mill's day, incest is still punished by both the courts and society, as this recent/local example shows.

Organs and Funerals

The Nuffield Council on Bioethics has suggested that the NHS could pay for the funerals of those who donate their organs. (News reported here.)

I find it somewhat curious that they draw a sharp distinction between this move and payment for the organs. Presumably this incentive is only likely to increase donation rates insofar as it is regarded by donors as a payment. So either it's a payment and thus undermines altruism and raises worries of exploitation, or it's not a payment but it's questionable whether it will really increase donation.

(Personally, I'm not convinced that donation need be wholly altruistic and am therefore open to the possibility of incentives.)

Dick and Philosophy

Yesterday one of my students asked whether Philip K. Dick and Philosophy was out yet. (I presented a draft version of my chapter to our student philosophy society last year.) It's not and, at the time, I had no idea when it's scheduled for release but, checking Amazon, I was pleased to see that it's out 24th November. My chapter, concerning appointing rulers by random mechanisms (as in Dick's Solar Lottery), is number ten.

Nirvana 20

For some unknown reason, I had some Nirvana songs stuck in my head on Friday, despite not having listened to my old Nirvana CDs in some time. It was quite a surprise then to walk in to Tesco on my way home and see them on the cover of Kerrang! It turns out that this Saturday was the 20th anniversary of Nevermind; a fact K! commemorated by means of a special tribute CD (which was much better than I expected actually). A more expensive souvenir is this 5-disc box set (£75!), though there's also a 2-disc remastered version of the album at a more reasonable price.

Ps and Qs (Bleg)

Something I've just been thinking about and want a second opinion on. (It's not anything I'm working on, just a thought sparked by something I was reading.)

Suppose we have two propositions, P and Q. P is true. Q is a more extreme version of P. Does it follow that Q is false? Or that we have reason to believe P rather than Q?

I think much depends on the content of these propositions and the way in which Q is more extreme than P. For instance:

P: Abortion is usually wrong.
Q: Abortion is always wrong.

Here P allows (though does not logically imply) that some abortions are not wrong, which Q doesn't. If it's the case that some abortions are permissible, then Q is false and we have reason not to believe it.

But one problem is that P, while true, might be under inclusive. For instance:

P: Abortion is always wrong after 30 weeks.
Q: Abortion is always wrong after 28 weeks.

Stipulate that Q is true. Then it follows that P is true also, because P is weaker. That Q is more extreme than P does not make it false, because it is true (by stipulation), even though P is also true. Someone who believes P believes truly, but they also have reason to adopt the more extreme position Q. (Because P is true, but not the whole truth.)

I think this counter example works, but it depends of course on P not being the whole truth. I'm wondering if there are other counter examples. I suspect, perhaps, there may be some in which the way that Q is more extreme than P is practically irrelevant. These would seem, at least, cases where though Q is actually less correct, there is no harm in moving from the correct belief P to the not entirely correct belief Q, given that Q entails P.

Thoughts and comments welcome...

Who Needs Males?

It's almost like something out of Jurassic Park: female guppies don't need males to reproduce.

Actually, it's not quite as exciting as sex changing. Apparently the female guppies are able to store male sperm for months after mating, before producing offspring. So males are needed somewhere along the line; the point is merely that releasing a lone female could ultimately end up resulting in a whole new colony of fish.

GRAD CONF: Political Realism (York, UK)

2011 York Graduate Conference in Political Philosophy

Theme: "Realism in Political Thought"

*CALL FOR PAPERS*

On Wednesday 16th November 2011, the postgraduates of the Political Philosophy Group at the University of York and the White Rose Association for Political Philosophy will host a one-day student-led conference on realism in political philosophy and intellectual history.

The aim of the conference is to address both the ‘realist’ turn in recent political philosophy and to offer graduate students an opportunity to present papers, receive helpful feedback in a friendly atmosphere, and exchange ideas with peers and working academics in the discipline of political theory. The conference will be student-led with support from working political theorists.

Graduate students interested in presenting papers should send their contributions (maximum 3000/3500 words in English) accompanied by an abstract (maximum 300 words in English) and a short CV, by no later than 20th October 2011.

Papers may focus on any aspect of political realism broadly understood; including (not exhaustively) realist theories of political legitimacy, non-ideal theory, and political action. Presentations should last no longer than 30 minutes, with another 30 minutes for discussion. Please note 20th October 2011 is also the deadline for registration for any person wishing to attend the conference without presenting a paper.

Conference registration will cost £15. Any who wish to attend the conference without presenting a paper can write to check availability.

To submit a paper and/or register, please send an email to Mr James Hodgson (jdh511@york.ac.uk) with ‘Registration’ in the subject line. In the body of
the text, please ensure you include: the name you wish to go on the list of attendees; your institutional affiliation; and any dietary requirements. Please address all correspondence (including paper submission and additional inquiries) to Mr James Hodgson (jdh511@york.ac.uk).

TurnItIn

The start of a new semester means new modules to teach. It's university policy here that all students essays get submitted to TurnItIn. I don't think this amounts to an assumption that they're guilty of plagiarism, but there's a discussion here on the Philosophy Smoker. (My comment here.)

First Book?

This advice thread on Leiter might be a useful resource for young academics thinking of writing their first book.

If A Tree Falls On The Road And No One's Around To Hear It...

On my way into work, at about 2:30 this afternoon, the main road between Stirling and campus (Airthrey Road) was being blocked by police because a large tree had been struck by lightning and there were concerns that it might fall. The policeman let me go past on the footpath the other side of the road (surely strange: if there's a risk of a tree falling presumably it'd be safer for my to cycle past as quickly as possible). Before I'd got very far at all, they then allowed traffic towards the university again and, shortly after, that going in to town as well, the road now re-opened in both directions.

Obviously at some point later in the afternoon they changed their mind about the safety of the situation. An all staff email round the university advised us that Airthrey Road was again closed and that we should take alternative routes home. When I left campus, I found that not only was the road cordoned off, but also the footpath, so I couldn't even get through by bike.

Now admittedly I don't know how much danger this tree poses, but the fact that they were letting traffic through previously, combined with the fact that it hadn't fallen all afternoon and there was no particular reason for it to do so in the brief time that I would be passing, led to me assume it wasn't that dangerous. In fact, I'm well aware every time that I cycle along this fairly busy stretch of road that I could get hit by a bus. It's quite possible that I'd actually be at less risk from the tree than I ordinarily am from buses (a risk removed by the closure of the road). As I say, I can't judge for sure how risky it was, but then nor could I put a figure on how likely I am to get hit by a bus.

Preventing me (or anyone else) from taking the risk is an example of paternalism - that is, the authorities pre-empt my own judgement and seek to decide for me what is good for me as if I am a child, incapable of coming to my own decisions. Many philosophers, J. S. Mill among them, think that paternalism is wrong (at least in most cases). It's true that it may sometimes be justifiable. Perhaps the fact that I didn't know the true risk, for example, means that my decision to take the risk would not really be autonomous. But, even if one agrees with that, the obvious solution is to inform people of the risk, rather than to prohibit them from taking it.

As it happened, I turned back on to campus and took another route. Not only did this take me out of my way, but it involved going up and down a hill, along a poorly-surfaced path I didn't really know, in diminishing daylight, and coming off my bike when I hit a (not very low) drop-curb. When I came out the other side, the tree hadn't fallen, so perhaps I really would have been safer taking the usual road after all...

Correlation is not Causation

The BBC reports here on a study into cycling. I'm all for cycling and pedal my way to work as often as I can, though that's markedly less often in the winter. The article mentions the contribution that cycling makes to the economy, which I'd imagine to be absolutely negligible compared to cars. Then, when it turns to the more important health benefits, it says this:

"And [the report] says a 20% increase in cycling levels by 2015 could save millions of pounds in reduced congestion, pollution levels and NHS costs.
The report says that regular cyclists take 7.4 sick days per year, compared with 8.7 sick days for non-cyclists, saving around £128m through reduced absenteeism, with projected savings of £2bn over the next 10 years."

Now it's true that cycling is exercise and exercise helps keep you fit and healthy, but it doesn't follow that cyclists take fewer sick days because they cycle. It's quite likely that those who choose to cycle are already relatively young and fit, compared to those who don't, so we'd expect them to take fewer sick days. In other words, the correlation here may simply be a case of selection bias.

The Dangers of Gunfire

This BBC piece highlights the dangers of celebratory gunfire, where bullets shot into the air can fall on and kill bystanders. This was the bit that struck me though: "a number of US states including California, Texas, Arizona and Ohio outlaw firing a gun into the air. In Minnesota, it is specifically forbidden in cemeteries." Why cemeteries?

National Student Survey

Stirling comes joint third among Scottish universities (behind St Andrews and Glasgow but ahead of Edinburgh), with 88% of respondents declaring themselves satisfied overall with their course. In Philosophy, the news is even better, with 97% overall satisfaction, though this is still a fall from last year's 100%.

Sunday Drinking Bans

I like collecting little examples of things that have been banned to use when teaching Mill's On Liberty. Most of my students, I hope, don't think that homosexuality should be banned, but here's a good one: between 1881 and 1961 it was illegal for Welsh pubs to serve alcohol on Sundays.

A UK Bill of Rights?

Apparently there's a Commission on a UK Bill of Rights, seeking written responses to its discussion paper until November. This could be a chance for some impact, particularly given that I'm organizing a conference on Democracy and Rights in September.

Vote Counting Machines

Weren't vote counting machines a huge waste of money to be necessitated by AV? And yet now it seems that we have them anyway.

Paying for Organs

More controversy about organ supplies in the news: a Dundee academic has suggested that we should consider payments to donors. This came in the BMJ (unfortunately I can't access this, at present at least), but has been widely reported, for instance by the BBC. The BBC report only mentions students and, coincidentally, the £28,000 suggested for a kidney covers three years' tuition fees (at £9,000/year) with a little beer money left over...

Organ Nudge

It seems that manadated choice concerning organ donation is a step closer, with proposals that those applying for a driving licence will have to say yes or no. (The BBC article gives the impression that this change has, or at least will, be implemented, but in fact it seems that it is simply a proposal at the moment.)

It's not much of a nudge, since it doesn't direct people towards answering yes, as some have proposed. Nonetheless, simply requiring people to confront the issue is likely I'd have thought to lead to more opting in, rather than simply passing over the issue. Even this, though, seems to have roused a lot of opposition, judging by the comments on the BBC story.

Legal Territorial Jurisdiction

I have a paper - hopefully forthcoming, details to follow - in which I claim that the law subjects everyone globally to coercion, because (for instance) a law requiring that people drive on the left in the UK applies equally to all persons driving in the UK. I think an awful lot of political philosophy/theory gets things wrong by focusing on people, rather than territory, though I understand that there have been recent moves to redress this (for instance Chris Bertram's Territory and Justice network).

Anyway, I was struck by this case, reported on the BBC. The case centres on George 'Star Wars' Lucas suing the man who originally made Storm Trooper helmets (Mr Ainsworth) for selling them, on the grounds that he (Ainsworth) no longer owned the copyright. As the BBC reports:

"Lucasfilm sued for $20m in 2004, arguing Mr Ainsworth did not hold the intellectual property rights and had no right to sell them - a point upheld by a US court.
But the judgement could not be enforced because the designer held no assets in the US, so the battle moved to the UK."

The interesting point, made explicit in an earlier version of the story, but not as clear now, is that the UK court upheld the US decision that Ainsworth could not sell the helmets in the US. This, I think, raises interesting issues, though I'm insufficiently clear on either the details of the case or the necessary legal theory. It looks to me though as if the UK court's decision binds a British citizen not to do something in US territory...

Cuts to Graduate Funding

New story on the BBC website suggesting cuts to PhD and Masters funding all round, not only in the humanities.

Shawcross on Expansion Consistency

One commonly accepted axiom of choice theory is what's often called 'expansion consistency', the idea of which is that if P is chosen from the set of P, Q, and R then adding S to the set shouldn't lead to P losing to either Q or R. (This is closely related to Arrow's Indepence condition.) To give a trivial example, suppose that you have the option of vanilla or chocolate ice cream and choose vanilla. Then you're told that strawberry is also available. To say 'oh, well in that case I'll have chocolate' would seem odd, since chocolate was available before.

Note, however, that one isn't required to stick with one's original choice when the expanded set of options includes more attractive alternatives: it would be quite understandable for you to switch to strawberry ice cream if that is your favourite. This point seems lost of Stoke's Ryan Shawcross, who apparently decided to commit his footballing allegiance to England before having the option of choosing Wales. Here's what he says:

"I made my decision a long time ago when the current rule wasn't in place that I could play for Wales.... My decision might have been different if the current rule was in place at the time but these things happen."

A FIFA rule change in 2009 means that, though Shawcross wasn't previously eligible for Wales, he now is. But it seems that he's unwilling to consider switching allegiance, having decided to commit to England (when Wales wasn't an option). This is rather odd.

In effect, he's saying that he chose X when only X was available, and now that he has the choice of X or Y he's unwilling to consider Y, because of that prior decision. Of course, I'm not criticizing him for choosing England over Wales, but he admits that he might now have chosen differently. To regard himself as bound by a past decision, which was hardly really a choice, now that he has a wider range of options seems irrational.

The Qualifications Gap

Apparently 35% of adults in Glasgow North East have no educational qualifications whatsoever.

It's hard to know what to make of this study, however. The fact that more educated people tend to be in the south east and the less educated in the west midlands and north doesn't necessarily show that those in the north have less educational opportunities. It could be that all have the same opportunities, but the more educated move to London for work, leaving their less educated peers behind.

Another problem is that the 'adult population' is rather varied including, for instance, immigrants and those who left school 50+ years ago, not needing any qualifications. It's not clear, then, what these statistics mean for the opportunities facing today's youngsters. I'd think practically anyone is capable of getting at least a GCSE - it's not that hard - so it would be rather scary if that many youngsters today were failing to get any qualifications.

This highlights a further, more significant, feature: there's an awful lot of variation between those with 'some qualifications', between for instance a solitary GCSE and an undergraduate (or postgraduate) degree. Again, something not clear from this, rather simplistic, survey...

Picking Journal Referees

I'm meaning to write something on refereeing sometime soon (when I get chance), but in the meantime this post at Leiter looks as if it could generate interesting discussion as to how editors go about approaching referees. I'm always curious how and why I get approached.

Update

I've seen a few things of interest in the news lately, but I've still been unable to add links here on my home internet connection. Here are a few:

Doctors want to change clocks.

BMA maintains support for opt-out organ donation.

MPs to pay more for pensions.

Hopefully normal service will be resumed soon - but, in the meantime, marking is just over and now conference season begins...

Career Reflections

In the opening of Plato's Republic, Socrates remarks that he enjoys conversing with older companions - such as Cephalus - because they have wisdom about the life ahead of him. Perhaps the modern world is such that my impending 30s will be very different from those of my much older colleagues, but it's still helpful I think to look to those not so far ahead of me in charting where I want to go and how I'm going to get there.

Colin Farrelly reflects here on his journey to becoming full professor. Not so much explicit advice, but interesting reading for those of us following in his footsteps. Not much over a year ago, I didn't know I'd be in Stirling now. I wonder where I'll be in ten years' time...

Roundtable of Journal Editors

This discussion of how journals work in Theoria is quite interesting, especially I assume for those without much insight. I'm somewhat surprised how difficult it seems to be to find referees, though perhaps this explains why I've sometimes been asked to review some stuff that hardly falls in my area of expertise (narrowly defined). As suggested, it's doubtless because of increasing pressures to publish, and a significant influx of submissions from graduate students.

I'm not sure about the suggestion that quality should outweigh quantity in assessing scholars by their publications though. It seems to me that, other things equal, someone producing more good scholarship ought to be preferred to someone producing less scholarship of an equal - or maybe even slightly higher - standard. (This is all the more true, I think, given that quality is difficult to measure - though I'm unsure whether quantity should be measured in articles or words.) Of course, we should factor in considerations about people's circumstances: a post-doc gets more research time than a lecturer and thus ought to produce either more or better publications.

It's also interesting to get insight as to how Ethics works from Henry Richardson. Apparently they now receive around 400 manuscripts a year and only a quarter even make it to review. Hence I was pretty pleased with my paper!

BSET 2012 CFP

Having just enjoyed a very successful Law and Philosophy Graduate Conference here in Stirling, it's time already to look forward to another conference...

First CALL FOR PAPERS

The BRITISH SOCIETY for ETHICAL THEORY

2012 CONFERENCE

University of Stirling, UK

Mon 9th - Wed 11th July 2012

Keynote Speakers:

Sarah Broadie (St Andrews)
Frances Kamm (Harvard)


Papers are invited for the 2012 annual conference of the British Society for
Ethical Theory, to be held at the University of Stirling, following directly on from the Joint Session.
The subject area is open within metaethics and normative ethics. Papers on topics in
applied ethics, moral psychology or the history of ethics may also be considered provided
they are also of wider theoretical interest.

Papers, which should be unpublished at the time of submission, should be
in English, no longer than 6500 words, readable in 45 minutes and prepared for blind review.

BSET is keen that all selected papers will be communicated clearly to its conference audience.
Please bear in mind that all sessions are plenary, so the venue will be more like a lecture hall than a
seminar room.

Please send your anonymous submission electronically, and include an abstract.
In a separate document list your full name, address and academic affiliation. Those who submitted
papers for our previous conferences - successfully or otherwise - are welcome to submit again, although not the same papers.

BSET operates a system whereby the papers will have all identifications removed BEFORE being
sent to our Chief Referee, who contacts other referees and finalizes the program. The one exception to this is the identification of postgraduate status. Please tell us if you are a postgraduate student as submissions from
postgraduates are encouraged; we aim to have at least one graduate speak at the conference.

Selected conference papers will be considered for publication in the journal Ethical
Theory and Moral Practice. Please make clear in any covering email
whether you intend your paper to be considered for publication here as well as
for the conference programme, although final decision on this matter need not be made by the author
until the time of the conference itself.

The deadline for submissions is Friday 9th December 2010.

Papers and accompanying particulars should be emailed to the contact email on the following page:

http://www.bset.org.uk/2012.html [under construction]

Note that ONLY electronic submissions will be accepted.